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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The Persistence of Crisis and Recovery 
 
 
Just as economic policymakers celebrated the fined tuned nature of capitalism at the 
beginning of the 21st century, having now made ‘bank runs, financial panics, and 
depressions…a thing of the past’, so too did many Marxists eight years later hail the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) as the beginning of the end for capitalism, a ‘terminal 
crisis’ from which the social system would not revive (Landefeld, 2000: 8; Ticktin, 
2011: 407). Yet capitalism has continued to surprise both parties. This in part can be 
explained with regard to each side’s theoretical investigative process, with both 
frameworks focusing on only one side of capitalism’s cyclical rhythms and secular 
trends. 
 
 
While many writers, as far back as Marx (2010c: 69) himself, have noted the failure 
of ‘vulgar economists’ to account for the possibility of economic crisis in their 
analysis, fewer writers have addressed Marxian failures to account for economic 
recovery (Bezemer, 2009: 3; Harman, 2010: 56-57; Roberts, 2016: 1-2). Within 
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Marxian theories of economic crisis there is, as economist like Freeman (2015: 79) 
state, a ‘missing half of the discussion: how, and when can we say a crisis is over?’ 
(Freeman, 2015: 79). In part, this failure has been a result of Marxian inquiry filling 
another literature gap left behind by conventional economics, these writers tasking 
themselves with the mission of responding and convincing conventional economic 
theory that crisis are endemic to capitalism and will continue to reoccur regardless of 
policy (Clarke, 1994: 4). 
 
 
Indeed, some Marxists have been criticised on the very basis of addressing this 
question, with implications that even attempting to explain the reoccurrence of 
economic recovery falls into a kind of theoretical trap of assuming crises of capitalism 
are temporary, minor and/or insignificant events (Sherman, 1991: 80). This is all in 
the context of the basic empirical reality of actually existing capitalism, that 
‘capitalism as a system has each time recovered’, sometimes into booms of economic 
growth and other times into stagnation. (Dunn, 2011: 525). The aim and purpose of 
this thesis, therefore, will be to address this gap in the Marxian crisis theory literature. 
It will put forward a preliminary version of a Marxian theory of economic recovery, 
adopting one of Marx’s own explanations for recovery from crisis in the short and 
long term. 
 
 
This explanation is ‘capital destruction’ or ‘devalorisation’, a movement described by 
Marx (2015: 361-364) that takes two separate forms, though both forms may occur 
together. The first is the actual physical destruction of capital assets, such as machines 
used for production and circulating commodities. As will be seen in the historical 
overview of capital destruction in chapters 4 and 5, exogenous events such as armed 
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conflicts may contribute significantly to the physical destruction of capital, such as 
when productive sectors are destroyed through bombing, as occurred to the major 
industrialized capitalist nation states of Japan and Germany. The more typical 
physical destruction of capital occurs through the reoccurring business cycle, when a 
capitalist goes bankrupt and their capital remains idle, such as laying unused in a 
warehouse. What is particularly important for economic recovery in the first form of 
capital destruction, and what distinguishes it from the second form, is its expulsion of 
this capital from the capitalist mode of production through the removal of its use 
value (the use it fulfilled for society), its exchange value (its price) and its ability to 
realize surplus value and profit (i.e. its ability to yield more money-capital at the end 
of production than was invested at the beginning of it). 
 
 
In the second form of capital destruction, the capital loses its exchange value. That is 
its price decreases, but it retains its original use value, thereby making it able to 
realize the same amount of surplus value it would have before. Marx (2015: 363) also 
refers to this second form as ‘capital devalorisation’ or ‘depreciation’, since the 
process is comparable to an intensified or sped-up version of the amortization of fixed 
capital, that is the ‘wear and tear’ capital receives over times that decreases its 
exchange value. While this is not beneficial to the capitalist currently holding this 
destroyed or devalued capital, it becomes beneficial to a capitalist who can purchase 
this capital at a reduced price but at the same rate of surplus value. This in turn 
induces the capitalist to reengage or increase the expansion of productive 
accumulation in order to realize this surplus value. This is the basic process of how 
capital destruction works, but the specific details of how it connects with a theory of 
crisis and the process of recovery will be explored in more detail later in the thesis, as 
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the immediate issue at hand is answering why capital destruction is being addressed in 
the first place, and why the topic has not been more widely discussed thus far. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Current State of Marxian Crisis Theory 
 
 
Economic crisis theory has been one of the thematic cornerstones of discussion in 
academic Marxian literature, with countless articles and books addressing the topic. 
It’s importance, as well as its imperfect nature, can be seen in the coalescence of some 
of the most prominent experts in economic crisis theory at Izmir University; come to 
discuss the causes of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis from a Marxian perspective. As 
one of these speakers, John Weeks (2014a: 3), reflected in his paper: ‘Any theory of 
capitalist reproduction with a pretension to be seriously considered must account for 
economic crises’. To this quote my thesis would add the corollary ‘economic crisis 
and recovery’, for it is the contention of this thesis that to understand the full 
dynamics of reoccurring crisis within capitalism, a better understanding of how 
capitalism escapes recurrent crisis must be understood. Week’s quote reveals a 
fundamental gap within Marxian crisis literature. While there has been a plethora of 
works discussing how capitalist production comes into crisis, few have addressed how 
capitalist production recovers from this crisis. 
 
 
Those who have brought forward detailed theories have oddly been reminiscent of 
mirror neoclassical explanations for economic crisis, with cursory, happenstance 
and/or exogenous forces seeing the economy out of its endogenous based 
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contradiction of production and/or circulation (Dunn, 2014: 61). For example, 
Weisskopf (1994: 146) argues that though the social structures of capitalist 
accumulation may very well foster institutional conditions for economic recovery (for 
example, the capitalist State providing some manner of guarantee that capitalists will 
achieve a profit during a crisis of surplus value realization) there is ‘nothing automatic 
in the dynamics of the crisis to assure the emergence of institutions that will sustain a 
new boom’ with recovery being contingent on ‘the course of political struggles and 
concrete historical events’. Other popular Marxists such as Mandel (1977: 347) make 
the theoretical contrast even more distinctively, stating: 
 
 
Whereas the upper turning points from the boom to the depressive phase are 
determined largely by endogenous factors…this is not true of the lower turning 
points. Exogenous ‘systems shocks’ of various kinds are needed to propel the 
system out of the depressive phase.1 
 
 
And though Mandel’s analysis of capitalism recovery is more systematic than any 
neoclassical treatment of business cycle declines, integrating a kind of eclectic 
relation between the initial ‘exogenous extraeconomic factors’ of recovery that act 
upon and stimulate some internal features of capitalism to fuel a new wave of 
expansion, in the last instance the initial restoration of accumulation from depression 
comes through something outside of that process itself. Therefore, in the same way 
that Marxists may reflect critically on economists who act as ‘apologists for 
capitalism’ and who, despite crises periodically reoccurring for over two hundred 
 
 
1 This quote was kindly shown to me by Dr. Bill Dunn (University of Sydney) who has my 
thanks. 
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years, continue to explain away recessions by reference to external forces outside of 
the economic system of capitalism, so too will this thesis critically evaluate current 
notions within Marxist literature that recovery is not an endogenous force, despite 
capitalisms ongoing emergence from economic crisis (Clarke, 1994: 1). For if most 
Marxists agree that a theory of crisis should focus on the inherent contradictions from 
within capitalism that cause economic disruption (Dunn, 2011; Fine, 1979: 76), it 
would appear that at least in regard to methodological consistency, the same notion 
should apply to economic recovery. 
 
 
These theories of crisis have been wide ranging, though due to word limitation this 
thesis cannot explore all of them in detail. They include the underconsumption of 
capital and consumer commodities, the overproduction of these commodities, rising 
wages ‘squeezing’ away the profit rate, as well as belief that there is a ‘tendency’ for 
capitalist profits to decline overtime due to a rising ratio of the means of production to 
labour power (Clarke, 1994: 7). As noted by Dunn (2011), however, the illustration of 
these theories by Marxists academics have largely ignored the need to explain both 
sides of the process, constituting a failure to integrate a theory of economic recovery 
into their theory of capitalist crisis. 
 
 
In part, this may be explained by the presumption by crisis theorists that, as Anwar 
Shaikh (1978: 219) argues, any discussion of crisis is inherently a discussion of 
reproduction and vice versa, and that this is ‘true whether or not a particular theory 
makes this connection explicit’. In other words, the theoretical construction of 
economic recovery is already apparent in the mechanisms of crisis, e.g. if rising 
wages are the cause of crisis, decreasing or stagnant wages are the cause of recovery. 
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While this may be the case, it should not be assumed without empirical support. The 
specific features of a recovery may be different depending on the time and place it 
occurs. For, example in the case of increasing wages as the source of economic crisis, 
capitalists may not necessarily decrease real wages directly, but rather through 
passing on costs through the price of consumer goods, as occurred in the 1970s 
(Mattick, 1981: 146). 
 
 
Purpose, Aim and Structure of Thesis 
 
 
Regardless of why Marxian crisis theory developed in this one-sided fashion, its 
consequences has produced a one-sided view of the nature of capitalism. This is not to 
claim that all crisis theory literature hitherto has lacked insight or even that is has 
failed to be comprehensive when dealing with its subject, but only that (like any 
potential framework) it has simply been preoccupied with certain avenues of 
theoretical and empirical inquiry, this being the nature of economic crisis under 
capitalism. The broader aim and purpose of this thesis is to encourage by example the 
same degree of insight and analysis into the mechanisms behind capitalist recovery be 
undertaken. This relates to its more immediate purpose, this being to fill this space in 
the literature itself, so as promote at least one possible way forward. 
 
In particular, the aim is to provide four academic insights. Firstly, it will provide a 
preliminary theory of recovery that compliments an existing Marxian theory of 
economic crisis, sourced from Marx’s own evolving (though incomplete) theory of 
capital destruction and its relation in the cyclical and secular movements of 
capitalism. Secondly, it will give insight into the role capital destruction has played 
within capitalist recovery through an historical and empirical investigation. 
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Interrelated to this, the third insight the thesis hopes to provide is into the nature of the 
Law of the Tendential Fall in the Rate of Profit (LTFROP) theory of economic crisis, 
but from the perspective of how the contradiction is resolved. It’s fourth and final aim 
will be to provide a synthesis of both the empirical and the theoretical aspects of 
capital destruction to provide some small insight into the nature of modern capitalism, 
in particular the capitalist’s State role in the capital devalorisation and recovery 
process. 
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
 
 
In order to achieve these aims, the thesis has shaped itself in accordance with both 
Marx’s mode of presentation (i.e. structure) and mode of research. For Marx, the 
starting points of academic analysis and the subsequent analytical movement 
forthwith are not arbitrary, but are significant features that begin the process of 
uncovering and understanding social reality (Harvey, 1982: 1). 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
As Chapter 2 explores in further detail, this is a movement back and forth between 
theoretical abstraction and concrete data, with each informing the other. This is an 
adoption of Marx’s historical materialist and dialectical method and both ideas, being 
contested within contemporary Marxian literature, are outlined and considered within 
the context of interpreting Marx ‘correctly’ (Kliman, 2007: xiii-xiv). The dialectical 
relationship between recovery and crisis through the mechanism of capital destruction 
is then put forward, and a preliminary indication is given of the State’s evolving 
relation to capital destruction due to the changing material conditions through time. 
With the theoretical parameters established, the use of data in measuring concrete 
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social reality is then considered. It is determined that the US economy, having 
become the global capitalist hegemon since the early 20th century, is the best option 
available for measuring the world economy over many cycles, acting as a proxy with 
consistent and easily accessible time series data. How capital destruction is best to be 
represented is also discussed, in particular the ways it’s degree can be measured 
through the quantity of business bankruptcies and insolvencies. 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the abstract and general elements of economic recovery, 
examining two possible avenues sourced from Marx’s work that may be adapted into 
a theory of economic recovery and integrated with a theory of crisis, this being the 
theory of countertendencies and the theory of capital destruction/devalorisation. Both 
avenues are related to the LTFROP, a theory of crisis that sees declining rates of 
profit within capitalist production as the main source of contradiction for the process 
of accumulation. Those writers who have used countertendencies and capital 
destruction to explain economic recovery will be overviewed, along with preliminary 
data being investigated to see if either concept contains empirical evidence to lend 
support to its accuracy. The chapter concludes that the theory with the most potential 
to explain both short term and long term economic cycles of crisis and recovery is 
capital destruction. 
 
Chapter 4 
 
 
Having examined the abstract and general aspects of a theory of recovery, chapter 4 
moves the analysis of the thesis to the concrete and specific ways capital 
devalorisation works within actually existing capitalism. It starts towards the end of 
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the 19th century, observing the initial steps by the US State towards a more active role 
in mediating and controlling the social consequences resulting in economic crisis with 
a particular focus on the effects of capital destruction. The chapter finds that though 
the devalorization process that occurred during the economic crisis and even the First 
World War may have resolved short term cycles of expanding accumulation, there is 
still a long-term rise in capital stock that results in a secular decline in the rate of 
profit. 
 
This long term decline culminates in an unprecedented crisis, such as was the Great 
Depression. This systemic crisis that produced unprecedented political instability for 
American capitalism, would see the US State embrace more direct policy methods in 
its efforts to ameliorate the social consequences resulting from crisis and capital 
destruction, such as mass unemployment and business insolvency. However, it was 
only with the success of American state based capitalism brought on by the events of 
World War II that would see the State embrace this interventionist attitude totally, the 
discussion of which is continued in chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 5 
 
 
This chapter continues the empirical investigation started in chapter 4, picking up 
from the start of the second global conflict to beset world capitalism in the 20th 
century, World War II. Attention is returned again to the US State’s role in the capital 
destruction/devalorisation process, especially as it significantly expanded its 
coordination of the economy and overtook a large portion of production and 
distribution. An analysis of the erasure of a large degree of unused capital stock either 
removed from the market or acquisitioned by other capitalists during the Great 
Depression and World War II is given, as well as three major revalorization processes 
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that occurred: 1) capital converting and then reconverting into military and civilian 
industry during World War II, 2) the large portion of physical capital destruction that 
occurred in capitalist nations such as Japan, Germany, Britain and France that allowed 
for not only renewed local reproduction but also for the US to export capital stock, 
and 3) whether the newly created military industrial complex in the post-war period 
could absorb a large portion of capital stock and regularly remove it through conflict. 
 
With an unprecedented recovery in the rate of profit leading to a subsequent period of 
strong economic growth, as well as the belief by state officials of the importance of 
preventing a return to an era like the Great Depression through state fiscal and 
monetary policy, the rate of capital devalorisation was incredibly stable from 1945 to 
1970. While this itself would contribute to another systemic crisis during the early 
1970s, issue with the measurement of economic data make it difficult to ascertain 
whether there was sufficient capital devalorisation for a return to economic growth, or 
whether growth post-1980s has been attributable to the expansion into the financial 
sector. 
 
Chapter 6 
 
A brief summary is given about what this limited thesis has hoped to accomplish. It 
argues that enough evidence has been presented to consider capital 
destruction/devalorisation as an economic phenomena to be considered, especially 
when discussing the rate of profit. Furthermore, it believes that this phenomena has 
the potential to help explain how capitalism is able to escape economic crisis in the 
short term. Reflecting on the empirical elements of capital devalorisation highlighted 
in this thesis, this section also briefly returns to the abstract, examining the 
contradictory nature of the system capitalism in its totality, arguing that while capital 
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devalorisation may provide an endogenous mechanism of recovery for capitalists, it 
simultaneously breaks down the fundamental social relation of capitalism, that of the 
labor-capitalist ‘contract’. In attempting to avoid a contradiction of the accumulation 
process, the system creates a political contradiction by removing the basis of its 
legitimacy with the working class, the subsistence of workers through paid labor. 
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Chapter 2 
Marx’s Method and Capital Destruction 
Introduction 
 
 
 
As given in a preliminary outline in chapter 1, this thesis adopts two centrals aspects 
of Marx’s method, that being historical materialism and dialectics. This chapter will 
provide an outline of what it believes ‘Marx’s method’ actually constitutes and how 
this relates to understanding capital destruction. In the course of this outline, it will 
address some of the academic controversies surrounding Marx’s method, recognizing 
the impossibility of addressing all of the seemingly endless debates (Best, 2010: 88; 
Starosta, 2008: 295). While the purpose of the chapter is to explain the method behind 
the current thesis in hand, it will not proceed with a traditional social science 
discourse of listing Marx’s/Marxian ontology, epistemology, methodology, methods 
etc (such as Maguire, 2010). Academia itself is an organization of knowledge 
production formed by its historical material conditions. Best (2010:1) puts it most 
succinctly, it is a site of: ‘institutionally organized production and dissemination of 
explanations of the world and its components’. It would be an error, therefore, to filter 
Marx through a lens of understanding shaped by the very historical material 
conditions Marx’s method is attempting to illuminate. Such labelling would be a 
distortion of Marx’s views, and would not reveal the entire ‘truth’ and complex 
meaning behind his method (Tabak, 2012: ix). Naturally, however, these topics will 
be inherent within the outline below. 
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The main aspect of what this thesis adopts from Marx method is most notably the 
movement between broad theoretical concepts towards concrete and specific entities 
(Marx, 1993b: 100).This is the structure this thesis takes, considering capital 
destruction within abstract categories in chapters 2 and 3, and proceeding to layout 
capital destruction within empirical reality in chapters 4 and 5. This chapter, 
therefore, serves to bridge the two halves of the thesis, as well elaborating on the 
nature of the dialectic and material method. It also serves to outline some of the main 
empirical data that will be used to examine the cycle of the crisis, devalorisation and 
recovery. 
 
 
Marx Method 
 
 
 
The term ‘Marx method’ is used by Marxist to describe what many social scientists 
would call ‘methodology’. That is, traditional social science parlance refers to the 
‘method’ in the context of specific research tools (such as surveys or statistical 
regression) that are used in research. Meanwhile ‘methodology’ refers to the 
questions and theoretical assumptions that underpin the use of these tools (White, 
2011: xix). Yet, within both these traditional classifications of ‘method’ and 
‘methodology, neither convey the entirety of meaning when Marxists use the term 
‘Marx’s method’. Applying traditional social science definitions to Marx’s writing 
can lead to artificial classifications that do not exist in Marx’s conception of social 
phenomena (Foley, 1986: 1). Attempts at straightforward statements about Marx’s 
‘ontological’ or ‘epistemological’ view, therefore ⎯while not neccesarily inaccurate 
or even unenlightening⎯ can sacrifice the subtly and precision of Marx own position 
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for the sake of theoretical clarity (Maguire, 2010: 136). There is also another problem 
 
this thesis has in attempting to pin down the meaning of ‘Marx’s method’. 
 
 
Scholarship on Marx extends for more than a one-hundred-years and over dozens of 
differing native tongues, with an evolution down many esoteric paths (Carchedi, 101: 
2012). This means providing a concise yet comprehensive interpretation of any of 
Marx’s concepts can be exceedingly difficult. As Paolucci (2007: 4) notes, unlike 
other schools of social science investigation, not even basic issues within Marxism 
share universal academic assent. Scholarly debates regarding Marx’s method provide 
no exception, and indeed may be the most highly contested positions held in 
Marxism. Issues include, what is the relationship between Marx’s dialectic method 
and the traditional formal logic (Wilde, 1991), e.g. did Marx use ‘dialectical 
reasoning’ over ‘logical reasoning’ or did he use both, does Marx utilize different 
methods depending on the level of analysis he is engaging in, can Marx’s method be 
understood through studying those who inspired him? (see Paolucci, 2007: 5-6). 
There is also the problem of interpreting those who have interpreted ‘Marx method’. 
 
Professor Sieber, who Marx refers to in the Afterword to volume I of Capital, claimed 
Capital was a ‘necessary sequel’ to political economist David Ricardo’s body of work 
through its adoption of the latter’s ‘deductive method’ (Burns and Frazer, 2000: 81). 
Joan Robinson claimed Marx adopted the powerful tool of abstraction that he would 
later use from Ricardo from which social world models were built (Ibid). Others have 
pointed out the importance of Feuerbach’s materialistic perspective, that the social 
world reflects thought rather than it being a reflection of thought on Marx (Callinicos, 
2004: 62). Meikle (1991: 296) has stressed the exact opposite, arguing Aristotelian 
metaphysics (metaphysics literally translating into ‘beyond the physical’) influenced 
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some of the most basic ideas of Marx. The ‘new dialectics’ school has emphasised the 
importance of reinterpreting Marx and his dialectical method through a thorough 
reading of Hegel (Arthur, 2004). 
 
While which interpretation is applied to Marx has real consequences for 
understanding his work2, its breadth of discussion puts it beyond the objectives of this 
thesis. This thesis will focus on two interconnected areas it believes are not only most 
relevant to understanding Marx’s method and therefore the method of this thesis, but 
whose interconnection are the most central to understanding how Marx viewed social 
reality. These are historical materialism and dialectics, though with reference when 
relevant to other sources of influence on Marx work3. 
Dialectics and Historical Materialism 
 
 
The term ‘dialectics’ can refer to a range of meanings. Yet as the ‘unknown author’ of 
‘Dialectics’ notes in issue 1 of the 13th volume of Historical Materialism, attempting 
to define the ‘dialectic’ is problematic itself, not just because the meaning is widely 
contested, but also because any attempted definition is inherently ‘undialectical’. As 
Brecht argued, definitions are ‘static things’, while dialectics emphasize the transient 
nature of all phenomena (UA, 2005: 241). Recognizing this, it is still possible to 
provide the basic elements of meaning within ‘Marx’s dialectics’ without reducing the 
understanding of dialectics to these elements; this is what Marx himself did, as can be 
 
 
2 For example, Burns (2014: 83) argues if it is assumed Marx adopted a ‘deductive logic’ 
method than this leads to the ‘transformation problem’ 
3 Paolucci (2000: 301) puts forward four interrelated moments of method seen in Marx 
‘dialectical method, historical materialism, political-economies and the communist political 
project’. David Harvey puts forward (see companion to capital): 
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seen in his discussion of the definitions of ‘capital’ and ‘labor’ (among other things) 
 
in Capital. 
 
 
Marx’s (1982: 102-103) dialectics refers to the ever changing movement of 
phenomena, the persistent transition of the state of being of one phenomena to another 
and the connection of these phenomena to each-other. Its fundamental distinction with 
Hegel’s dialectic can be seen in what stimulates the change i.e. the source this change. 
For Hegel, the human mind, referred to as the ‘ideal’, transformed the material world 
as a reflection of itself. Marx, however, saw the essence of change in the historical 
material world, meaning that the ideal was in fact a reflection of the social material 
world (Callinicos, 2004: 62). As Engels noted, the implications of a dialectic frame of 
observation indicates that social systems are transitory, with each successive system 
containing the social conditions of its next stage, ‘…conditions which develop in its 
own womb’ (quoted in Callinicos, 2004: 62). Or as Marx state himself, dialectics 
‘regards every historically developed form as being in a fluid state, in motion…’ 
(quoted in Farr, 1991: 113). 
 
 
This distinction with Hegel brings to the forefront the significant interconnection 
between the first part of Marx’s method (dialectics) and the second part to be outlined 
here, that being historical materialism. Scientific social analysis, argues Marx (1976: 
8), must begin with the ‘human society…humanity’. Humanity distinguishes itself 
from other animals by producing their means of subsistence, ‘as individuals express 
their life, so they are’. The mode of subsistence determines their physical organisation 
amongst one another i.e. their social relations. Humanity is born into this ‘mode of 
life’ or what Marx (1976: 31) would later refer to as a ‘mode production’, and by 
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engaging in their fundamental requirement (subsistence) they reproduce this mode of 
subsistence. Yet as humanity’s activity reproduces their mode of subsistence, so does 
this very interaction begin to change that mode of subsistence. Why exactly this 
interaction subjects change is beyond the relevant scope of discussion, yet this outline 
of historical materialism is enough to move on to a discussion of its connection with 
dialectics (Best 2010: 3-4). 
 
 
The interconnection between historical materialism and dialectics, therefore, comes in 
one category explaining the other, and it might be observed to be a ‘dialectical’ 
relation. Historical materialism looks at the productive forces and the relations of 
production that are formed over time, while dialectics explains how this occurs over 
time. Yet this dialectical movement is not an abstract in the sense of Hegel’s dialectic, 
the latter of whom sees history not ‘according to the order in time’ but only to the 
‘sequence of ideas in the understanding’ (Marx and Engels: 165) The movement in 
Hegel’s dialectics is abstracted from real time and history and is ‘the purely logical 
formula of movement or the movement of pure reason’ (Marx and Engels: 164). Marx 
demonstrates in The Poverty of Philosophy that bringing this kind of abstract 
movement to issues within political economy leads to no real understanding of the 
subjects and that social reality is only understood when engaging with real historical 
relations, thus requiring a historical materialist perspective within dialectics. 
 
 
Marx Method and its Relation to Capital Destruction 
 
 
Having outlined the basics of historical materialism and dialectics, it is now necessary 
to relate how this synthesized method will be adopted and utilized in understanding 
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the process of capital destruction/devalorisation and furthermore its relation to 
economic recovery and crisis. 
 
 
The Dialectical and Historical Relation of Economic Crisis and Recovery 
 
 
As has been demonstrated by the outline of dialectics, no single category can be truly 
understood without some understanding its relationship to every other category 
(Harvey, 1984: xii). While this provides a ‘rich totality’ for analysis, its fault lays in 
practicality of application since these categories are many and each written work is 
limited in the space and time it can utilize (Marx, 1993b: 100). Having recognized 
this limitation, it is nonetheless possible to provide a dynamic analysis by examining 
the immediate relations of a category. It is the contention of this thesis that the best 
way to understand the process of economic recovery is to understand its dialectical 
relation with economic crisis; how each produces the other in an ongoing cyclical 
process of capital accumulation and capital devalorisation. It will be demonstrated 
that these two economic phenomena form to a significant degree the historical 
material conditions in which two political relations, that of class and the capitalist 
State, interact with one another. This interaction then establishes the conditions in 
which the next cyclical wave occurs. 
 
 
Thus, the movement of capitalist crisis and recovery cannot be understood in some 
abstract realm without considering the true historical material conditions from which 
it sprung. This is Marx’s (1976: 41; 2010: 110) contention with Feuerbach’s 
materialism and Proudhon’s political economic analysis; both fail to grasp the real 
historical development of capitalist social relations. This is what Marx (1993b: 237) 
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means when in the Grundrisse, he states that while it may seem ‘correct to begin with 
the real and concrete’ phenomena in political economic inquiry, such as ‘the 
population’, the term is an theoretical abstraction, which can only be truly understood 
when related to other determinants that make it up capitalism’s totality, such as the 
‘social classes’ of that population, who in turn must also be explained, along with 
their historical development (Best, 2014: 88-89). This thesis, therefore, traces the 
development of capital destruction within US capitalism from the late 19th century to 
the late 20th century, examining the changing relations within it, thus being an 
incorporation of both the dialectical and historical materialist method. 
 
 
There are, however, certain limitations that come with utilizing the dialectical and 
historical materialist method. As noted, not all dialectical relations and their 
development can be uncovered due to the vast amount of data that this would require 
and restrictions of word space within the thesis itself. While the method of this thesis 
places capital destruction and recovery within the totality of world capitalism rather 
than simply a sum of capitalist nations, it does not address all relevant determinations 
that may stem from this totality (Arrighi and Moore, 2001: 56). For example, Marx 
(1982: 911) discusses the importance that destruction of other modes of subsistence 
played not only in the formation of capitalism in Britain, but the role it played in the 
formation of British capitalism’s supremacy. Nor does this thesis investigate world 
capitalism in all its particular forms and subtleties in relation to capitalist recovery, 
though it hopes to present data that represents the general trend of capitalism within 
the 20th century. As noted, this is in part due of limitations of space within this thesis, 
and also in part due to the lack of available data across time and space that could be 
said to show capital destruction and its relationship to capital. 
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Marx (1992: 90-91) himself experienced a similar difficulty at the time of writing 
Capital, and so restricted his analysis to the major capitalist economy of his time, 
England (what he referred to as the ‘locus classicus’ i.e. ‘a classic case or example’) 
which was also a source of reliable and accessible social statistics. In line with this 
idea, to best illuminate the nature of capital destruction and its relation to economic 
crisis and recovery, the US economy is used in this thesis, an economy which 
overtook England as the dominant capitalist nation-state in the world economy during 
the early to mid 20th century (Arrighi and Moore, 2001: 65). Yet the US is chosen not 
only due to it being the locus classicus of modern capitalism, but also because it 
provides the most reliable data both in its availability and its longevity, thus making 
capital devalorisation measurable across the late 19th century right through to the 20th 
century, illuminating the interrelated process of accumulation, crisis and recovery in 
both its short and long terms dynamics. 
 
 
This brings to the forefront two interrelated avenues of inquiry and presentation, the 
first being where the analysis of capital destruction should begin and proceed from 
and secondly how can this movement can be measured. As stated, the method of 
presentation within this written work begins with the abstract and theoretical and 
builds upon this to the concrete and specific, the former being crucial to 
understanding the latter. This does not mean that these chapters do not contain 
elements of the other, i.e. that those chapters focusing on the theoretical do not 
contain empirical data and that those focusing on the concrete do not contain elements 
of theory. Rather, their demarcation is to highlight the focus of each, while keeping in 
mind that the nature of dialectical analysis is to move back and forth between the two. 
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Chapter 3 establishes that the most basic and simplistic relations of capital destruction 
are use value (the qualitative value i.e. usefulness of a commodity by individuals 
within society) exchange value (the value of a commodity in relation to how 
exchangeable it is with other commodities) and surplus value which is the unpaid 
labour realized by a capitalist through the sale of the commodity (see Marx, 2016: 
84). Marx (1992: 90; 125) himself begins Capital with the ‘economic cell-form’ of 
capitalism, the commodity. This then brings out the relation between devalorisation 
and economic crisis and how this establishes recovery. Beginning with Chapter 4 and 
5, these economic relations are built upon within the context of two political relations, 
that of class and the State. This is where the specific and concrete aspects of capital 
destruction in US economic history are put forward in detail, exploring devalorisation 
and its ongoing relation with modern capitalism and the US State. 
 
 
Measuring Capital Destruction/Devalorisation 
 
 
In chapters 4 and 5, capital destruction/devalorisation is measured quantitatively, 
primarily with the use of corporate bankruptcy data, which is presented between the 
period 1895-2000. The use of bankruptcy filing statistics is to provide a measure of 
two things. Firstly, whether there is a basic correlation between rising bankruptcy 
filings and crises, Its second purpose to act as an indicator of how much capital 
destruction has occurred. Bankruptcy data was chosen because it is the same measure 
that Marx used within his analysis of capital devalorisation and economic crisis as 
well due to its availability across time. It is used in conjunction with another two 
other pieces of data, Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) and the level of inventories. 
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Bankruptcy and M&A’s are measurements that are examining a similar type of capital 
devalorisation. As Marx notes, when a capitalist produces a certain quantity of 
commodities through production and a crisis reduces their exchange value far below 
their use value, this will mean they are not likely to be able to put forward the 
necessary money capital to engage in another series of production, and will therefore 
declare bankruptcy. There is a range of data on business bankruptcy declarations from 
the world’s largest capitalist economies, such as the USA, the United Kingdom and 
Germany, although they differ in their consistency and time span. The data that is 
likely to go back the furthest, be the most reliable and the most representative is the 
world’s largest economy the United States. The world’s fifth largest economy, the 
UK, does have data that spans from the 1860s to the present, though unlike the US it 
does not come from a single source. Data from the US, therefore, will be soley used. 
 
The second potential type of measurement for capital destruction is a merger and 
acquisition. A merger is defined as when two companies join together to form a new 
entity under mutual agreement, while an acquisition is when one business takes over 
another while retaining its original company. Most data on M&As that is outside the 
USA does not go any further back than the 1980s, and is thus not useful if a long term 
overview of these economies is desired. Again, our data collection must largely be 
restricted to the United States, since there are datasets that go back as far as 1900. 
Yet, unlike the bankruptcy data discussed above, data on M&A contain a number of 
problems. Firstly, the origin of M&A data comes from a variety of sources as opposed 
to one, not all of which may be reliable as a government bureaucracy. Secondly, data 
from the pre 1960s era does not include every single M&A that occurred in the 
economy, meaning that that their numbers may be under or overestimated within any 
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given year (Golbe and White, 1987: 27). Thus while it may be used to supplement 
bankruptcy data, it cannot be used as sole source in accounting for this process. 
 
Inventories are the physical stock of goods that a business maintains, and includes 
both capital and consumer commodities. Like the measurements mentioned before it, 
reliable and long term data on inventory stocks are restricted largely to the US 
economy. By looking at the inventory stocks of the US economy, this thesis will be 
able to determine to what degree capitalist commodities have been destroyed due to a 
crisis, which is the first type of destruction that Marx specifies. This data can be found 
with The Bureau of Economic Analysis, which provides data on changes in 
inventories from the period 1951 to the present, which does not cover the Great 
Depression. Fortunately, data on inventory stock changes from 1919 is measured and 
provided by another US government agency, the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER). Both datasets will be combined in order to establish the broad 
trend of the past two centuries. Since both agencies measure the inventory and stock 
of capital in US dollars, inflation will be a key variable that is accounted for. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Capitalism and Economic Recovery: In 
the General and Abstraction 
 
Introduction: Capital Devalorisation, Countertendencies and The Role 
 
They Play Within Capitalism’s Cyclical Recovery Process. 
 
 
This chapter begins the investigation into economic recovery by laying forth capital 
devalorisation in its abstract form. Before considering this determination and its role 
within the capital accumulation process, another potential explanation for economic 
recovery is considered. This is the role of countertendencies in restoring the rate of 
profit and thus moving the capitalist economy out of stagnate phase of reproduction 
(Duménil and Lévy, 2008: 104-105; Marx, 1993a: 339). As one of the central 
conditions for capitalist recovery is by capital destruction removing the high ratio of 
fixed capital to variable capital, it is appropriate to consider other ways this can occur, 
and examine how this has been used by some Marxists to explain the foundations 
from which economic recovery occurs (see section 3.3 for an account of these 
authors). 
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It was demonstrated in the introduction that (with several important exceptions such 
as the Regulation School) Marxian theories of crisis after World War II have been 
disinclined to focus on the cyclical nature of capitalism and the endogenous 
mechanisms behind recovery (Dunn, 2011: 525). Of course, as Shaikh (1978: 219) 
notes, any discussion of capitalist reproduction and non-reproduction are 
‘inseparable’. This means that any questioning of how and why non-reproduction 
occurs is also ‘implicitly or explicitly’ a discussion of why and how reproduction 
occurs. Regardless, specific processes and mechanisms of capitalist recovery from 
recession, even if implicit in crisis theory analysis, have still gone underdeveloped 
both theoretically and empirically (Dunn, 2011: 525; Freeman, 2015: 73-74). 
 
 
This is in part because of the belief in the ‘resurgence’ of capitalism after the 
recession and stagnation years of the 1970s with claims of an incoming new 
neoliberal order of capitalism restoring problems of demand in major Western nations 
such as the US through liberalizing and expanding of markets, especially the labour 
and financial markets (Overbeek and Apeldoorn, 2012: 5; Bakir, 2009: 337; Duménil 
and Lévy, 2004: 2; Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 254). Yet with arrival of one of the 
greatest ruptures in economic reproduction since the Great Depression, discussion 
about the nature of capitalist reproduction has shifted in focus. Writers are 
investigating, or atleast acknowledging, the notion of crisis containing the roots of 
economic recovery, with many containing reference to capital destruction (e.g. 
Carchedi, 2012: 146-147; Kliman, 2009; Roberts, 2015: 61; Giacché, 2011: 28-29). A 
good example is David Harvey. Writing in the early 1980s on Marx’s concept of 
capital destruction, Harvey noted that it was a ‘ “first cut” theory of crisis formation’ 
which while ‘insightful’ was better at illuminating the ‘social consequences’ of capital 
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destruction rather than as a determination necessary for capitalism to escape an 
economic crisis (Harvey, 1984: 203). After the GFC, however, Harvey (2015: 40-41) 
now contends that theories of crisis that stress the ‘impending dissolution of 
capitalism’ should be replaced with Marx’s view that crises were moments in which 
capital would overcome its contradiction of overaccumulation. 
 
 
Yet despite this renewed interest in the dichotomy of capitalist recovery within 
economic crisis, the relation has always been present in Marx’s body of work, both in 
early and late writings. This chapter will thus bring forward two possible theoretical 
avenues from Marx’s work from which a theory of recovery may be related. The first 
can be found with what Marx labelled the countertendencies (also referred to as 
‘counterfactors’) within the capitalist accumulation process that work to restore the 
rate of profit from its tendential fall. While Marx himself did not use this as a basis 
for a structured recovery theory, writers prescribing to the LTROPF theory of crisis 
have since adopted it as such. Two particular countertendencies that have been 
popular points from which to explain recovery will be focused upon, that of capitalists 
extending the working day (increasing the relative surplus value in a commodity) and 
capitalists increasing the intensity of work (increasing the absolute surplus value in a 
commodity) (Marx, 1993a: 339). The second theoretical avenue is the mechanism of 
capital destruction/devalorisation, a process in the cycle of reproduction put forward 
by Marx that restored the rate of profit by eliminating fixed capital entirely. Marxists 
who have used this theory to explain capitalist recovery will also be looked at in order 
to determine what insights can be provided into Marx’s framework and the benefits 
and/or limitations of their approach. 
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Equilibrium, Booms or Recovery? 
 
 
Yet before proceeding with this investigation into the avenues for understanding 
capitalist recovery, it is necessary to briefly distinguish what economic recovery 
actually constitutes since, as noted in Chapter 1, it is often used interchangeably with 
others terms such as ‘booms’, though they are distinct phases of accumulation 
(Freeman, 2010: 5-6). Furthermore, it is important to distinguish Marx’s cyclical 
analysis with that of orthodox economist’s notion of equilibrium, elements of which 
are often wittingly and unwittingly adopted in Marxian analysis (Freeman, 2010: 4; 
for example, see Duménil and Lévy, 1993: 147 and Shaikh, 2016: 1). 
 
 
The first distinction to be made between a Marxian theory of crisis and recovery and 
equilibrium economics is belief held by the latter that the cyclical nature of capitalism 
is a dichotomy of slump and boom, with boom being the ‘natural state’ the capitalist 
economy lies in. (Carchedi, 2012: 99-100; Freeman, 2010: 2). Yet the empirical 
reality suggests this not to be an accurate account of the dynamics of capitalism’s 
cyclicity. Freeman’s (2010: 4) analyses of real growth in the USA’s long run GDP 
suggests the empirical behaviour of indicators such as prices form less of rhythmic 
back and forth like a clock’s pendulum (as many economists might describe 
‘equilibrium’) and instead behave more a geyser, this being a fissure in the earth that 
sends intermittent, though random, spouts of water into the air rather than a rhythmic 
back and forth of a clock’s pendulum. Recreating Freeman’s (2010) data, Figure 3.1 
shows the annual growth rate of GDP reveals three periods of different growth 
patterns. From 1930 to 1948 growth varied widely, troughs ranging from a percentage 
growth of -13 and peaks of 18.5 percent. From 1949-1980 the economic cycle was 
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much milder in its peaks and troughs, the former ranging from an 8.7 percent growth 
to contraction of -1. The final period of growth, 1981-2007 saw growth largely 
stagnate, with growth not rising above 4.5 percent after 1984. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Percentage change in US GDP Growth, 1930-2006 
 
 
Source: Freeman, 2009. 
 
 
 
The second distinction between theories is that a Marxian theory of recovery does not 
assume, unlike many strains of equilibrium theory (particularly those developed in the 
arena of ‘business cycle analysts’ after the 1960s) that capitalists and other economic 
agents are restored to their previous socio-economic state after the resolution of the 
crisis (Carchedi, 2012: 99; Howard and Kolk, 1996: 148). Both potential theories of 
recovery explored below show the change in production relations during the new 
period of expansion. Capital destruction demonstrates the very nature of recovery 
depends on some capitalists winning out over others. The next cycle of accumulation, 
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therefore, sees a greater concentration of capital, subsequently changing the relations 
of capitalists with the State, labour and other capitalists (Marx, 2015: 362). A 
counteracting influences theory of recovery, which will be illustrated below, 
demonstrates that when an economic recovery ensues it is largely through the 
intensified exploitations of labour by capital, such as the cutting of real wages and 
benefits, expanding the work day and/or making labour work harder. It is important to 
recognise therefore, the actual elements and consequences of economic recovery, 
examining the ways this may affect the next cycle of reproduction. 
 
 
The third distinction between theories is that equilibrium economics assumes no 
material and historical limits to the capitalist mode of production, conflating a social 
institution for a natural one. A Marxists theory of crisis that recognizes the possibility 
of recovery does not assume that the latter is inevitable or that the capitalist system 
itself does not face social limits. In fact, with every cycle of crisis and recovery, the 
capitalist mode of production expands its contradictions, making each successive 
crisis more difficult to supersede. As Marx (2012: 79) states in the Communist 
Manifesto a recovery from crisis is simply ‘paving the way for more extensive and 
more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented’. 
Larger structural issues, contradictions that occur and reoccur over the long term due 
to the nature of the capitalist mode of production must be recognised. 
 
The final distinction to make is that the relation between capitalism’s cycle of growth 
and slump is not here considered as mere causality and effect, but one of dialectical 
relations. As already put forward, while slumps are the fruition of problems within the 
accumulation of capitalism, this is also the case for the solutions to the slump, i.e. it is 
the basis for more accumulation. As Marx affirms, ‘in as much as it [capital] both 
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posits a barrier specific to itself, and on the other side equally drives over and beyond 
every barrier, it is the living contradiction’ (quoted in Lebowitz, 2009: 111). This is 
apparent in the distinction in movement between crisis to recovery that was seen in 
the above paragraph; the new phase of accumulation is not capitalism returning to its 
previous state as equilibrium economics believe, it is rather the processes of 
capitalism developing into new forms. 
 
 
The Law of the Tendential Fall in the Rate of Profit (LTFROP) and its 
Relation to Economic Recovery 
 
 
While this chapter discusses two possible theoretical avenues put forward by Marx as 
a theory of recovery, as has been previously noted, both avenues presented emerge 
from the same theory of economic crisis interpreted from the works of Marx. This 
theory is the ‘Law of the Tendential Fall of the Rate of Profit’, which gained 
popularity after Engel’s publication of Marx’s incomplete writings now known as 
Capital Volume III, though it was mentioned directly and indirectly in other works by 
Marx (e.g. 1951: 427 and 1969: 29-30).4 The law refers to the relationship between 
the two kinds of capital invested within the means of production. One investment is 
dedicated to variable capital, which is the labour power of workers. The other is 
 
 
4 This thesis utilizes both the edited edition of Capital Volume III by Engels (Marx, 1993a) 
and the original unedited manuscript by Marx (2015). Due to heavy revisions by Engels of the 
manuscript (Marx, 2015: 4) the original unedited version is the dominant work used, though 
Engel’s volume is put forward to utilize both Engels’s preface to the work and Ernest 
Mandel’s Introduction, as well as to highlight quotes from when it conveys Marx’s work in a 
more structured and/or grammatically correct form (while still containing the original 
meaning). 
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investment in constant capital, such as machines and raw materials (Marx, 2015: 360- 
361). As Marx notes, it is only variable capital (labour power) that can create surplus 
value, which is the basis of profits for capitalists. Constant capital does not create 
surplus value, rather it is ‘the instrument [of the capitalist] need to squeeze surplus 
value out of the variable part of the capital’ in order to obtain profit (Marx 2015: 85). 
 
 
It is through this desire to acquire profit, that an individual capitalist will always seek 
to maximize the productivity of labour (Marx, 2015: 363-364). This means the 
capitalist will increase the amount of constant capital that the variable capital has to 
work with, thereby increasing the quantity of commodities that the capitalist can sell. 
Yet, as Marx notes, since labour is the sole producer of surplus value, the greater 
quantity of commodities will contain less value (Marx, 2015: 370). This means that 
the capitalist will, therefore, be producing a smaller rate of surplus value than 
previously and this will subsequently lead to a decline in the rate of profit. As the 
productivity measure is replicated throughout the economy, economic production will 
decrease and stagnate due to the decline in the rate of profit, eventually leading to a 
crisis (Marx, 2015: 364). 
 
 
Out of all the Marxian theories of economic crisis, the LTROPF is one of the most 
controversial, perhaps second only to the ‘transformation problem’ (Duménil and 
Lévy, 2008: 104-105; Harvey, 1984: 174; Howard and King, 1992: 128; Kliman, 
2007: 113). The LTROPF is also one of longest running controversies, with nearly all 
the central issues with it having been raised by 1945 (Howard and King (1992: 128). 
Criticisms have ranged from the logic of its proposition, its empirical veracity, to the 
degree of Marx’s conviction that it was an explanation for economic crisis (Shaikh, 
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1978: 234-235 Harvey, 1984: 174). As noted in Chapter 2, due to the vast amount of 
debate behind the law and the limited nature of this thesis, the extent to which these 
concerns can be discussed is limited. This thesis, therefore, will move forward with a 
theory of recovery on the foundation of the LTROPF as an explanation of crisis. 
 
 
This means that the theory of recovery will follow the same level of analysis, which is 
general in nature, looking at broad trends through the capitalist economy as a global 
whole. This does not mean that the specific will be ignored. Rather, it will be put 
together to help form an aggregate on which to understand general trends. It also 
means that the theory of recovery must show how it reclaims and rebalances what was 
lost through the crisis, as well as how its internal dynamics reverses and or counters 
the dynamics of the theory of crisis. In other words, it must show how and why it 
reverses or counters the processes of the declining rate of profit. The first possible 
theoretical avenue for forming a Marxian theory of recovery is the concept of 
countertendencies or counterfactors. 
 
 
Counterfactors and the Rate of Profit 
 
After outlining the LTROPF in Capital Volume III, Marx (1993a :339) makes a 
surprising confession; the law does not seem to have empirical data to support it. 
Looking at the previous thirty-year period, Marx recognizes while there has been a 
‘enormous mass of fixed capital’ formed in production, there has been no subsequent 
dramatic fall in the rate of profit. The answer, Marx states, is that ‘counteracting 
influences must be at work, checking and cancelling the effect of the general law and 
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giving it simply the character of a tendency’ (Ibid).5 It should be noted that 
countertendencies are not an exclusive mechanism for the rising rate of profit but 
occur throughout the capitalist economy. For example, the Marx saw reserve army of 
labor acting as a countertendency to the pressure of real wage increases (Rosdolsky, 
1977: 292-293). Yet it is only when discussing the general law of the declining rate of 
profit that Marx configured countertendencies in a significant way, outlining six in 
particular, although many Marxists have not limited their analysis to six (Harvey, 
1984: 178). 
 
 
While Marx does not directly put forward an argument that countertendencies are an 
instrument for economic recovery, discussing only their role as mechanisms for 
‘checking and cancelling’ the LTROPF, they have still been used as a foundation for 
Marxists for understanding how capitalism recovers from periods of crisis and 
stagnation (Carchedi, 2012: 86-87). The argument lies within the logic of the 
LTROPF itself since the decline rate of profit is the root of crisis, then its regeneration 
is also basis for recovery. Many Marxists have pointed to the recovery of the US and 
world economy from the crisis of profitability in the 1970s as an example of this (e.g. 
Duménil and Lévy 2011: 8; Mateo, 2016: 187). In order to assess the validity of 
whether countertendencies can be used as a basis for a Marxian theory of recovery, it 
is necessary to briefly bring forward and overview this body of work, assessing the 
strength and weaknesses of it’s framework from the stronger proponents of the theory. 
 
 
 
5 This thesis uses the term ‘counteracting factors’ and ‘countertendencies’ to refer to this 
process, though they have also been translated in Marx’s work and referenced by other 
writers as ‘counteracting influences’ (Marx, 1993a: 339) ‘countereffects’ (see Marx, 2015: 
342) ‘countervailing tendencies’ and ‘countervailing influences’(Harvey, 1984: 176). 
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Marxist authors such as Albo et al (2010), Duménil and Lévy (2004; 2011), Kotz 
(2012), Moseley (2013) Ougaard (2014) Ticktin (2011) argue that the four decades 
since the 1970s, particularly within the US, have seen efforts by capitalists to counter 
the decline in the rate of profit by increasing the exploitation of labour utilizing a 
diverse range of strategies. While some countertendencies not mentioned by Marx are 
given prevalence in these authors works, others emphasize the three counterfactors 
put forward by Marx’s in Capital Volume III as the most common processes from 
which capitalists regained profit (see below). These factors are the extraction of 
absolute surplus value, the extraction of relative surplus value, and pushing real 
wages below their value in order to lower variable capital costs (italics in original, 
Marx, 2015: 356-357). The first two counterfactors are defined by Marx as: ‘the 
appropriation of surplus labour and surplus value…increased by prolonging the 
working day and making work more intense’ (italics added Marx, 1993a: 339). Either 
kind of countertendency has a similar effect for capitalist reproduction, allowing the 
capitalist to increase their rate of profit without necessarily expanding production. 
 
 
While Marx outlines the countertendencies to the LTROPF in the third volume of 
Capital, they are built upon the observations about capitalism given in Capital 
Volume I. It is here that Marx outlines in that by prolonging the work day, the 
capitalist can increase the total amount work time, thereby increasing the proportion 
of paid to unpaid (or ‘surplus’) labour allowing for a larger absolute amount of 
surplus value. The division of the working day into these two processes is also the 
reference point for understanding how the capitalist is able to increase their relative 
surplus value. The capitalist can intensify the labour process, thereby reducing the 
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amount of time needed to create the same surplus-value (Marx, 1982: 645). Yet it was 
only during the mid 1960s that Marxists began to notice the earnest adoption of these 
two types of strategies. Current literature examining the period has even referred to a 
process where there was a ‘tendency for the rate of exploitation to rise’ (Kotz, 2012: 
252). The historical material context of Post-War period helps explain this. With the 
end of World War II and the US and its allies achieving victory, there was mass of 
expenditure on fixed capital by US capitalists, with much of this in large investments 
in ‘unproductive sectors’ such as the military and financial sector (Harman 2010: 236- 
237). Furthermore, the recovering and quickly expanding economies of Japan and 
German (with the help of the US) was the increased competitive pressure on US 
capitalists. Both processes began to seriously affect and deteriorate the national rate of 
profit, causing sluggish growth and eventually leading to a major economic crisis 
starting in the US and spreading to the rest of the world (Harman 2010: 236-238; 
Mattick, 1974: 135; Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 81). 
 
 
As the crisis saw the living conditions of the working class decline, labour was 
encouraged by capital to increase their working hours in order to maintain the level of 
consumption and material gain they had achieved in the preceding decade, laying the 
foundations for the persistent trend of higher than average hours worked by US 
citizens when compared to other similar capitalist nations (Foster and Magdoff 2008; 
Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 291). It is argued, therefore, that this has subsequently 
helped address both the production of surplus by creating a large mass of profit and 
the realization of surplus value by maintaining levels of consumption (Foster and 
Magdoff 2008). In the United States, for example, total average working hours per 
year increased from 1,883 in 1980 to 1,966 in 1997 (Harman, 2010: 236). 
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Yet when examining the data further, the evidence does not seem to concretely 
confirm this strategy was undertook by capitalists, instead pointing to a steady decline 
in the absolute hours worked by labour. Using the same data source and 
classifications Harman utilizes, we can see that total average hours worked by 
American labour in the service sector (including manufacturing) was 43 hours in 
1969, 41.9 hours in 1975, 32.3 in 2001 and 32.5 in 2008 (ILO, 2016: 77). A separate 
compiled set of data from the OECD also indicates this trend in the United Kingdom, 
workers hours dropping from 1,958 hours in 1950 to 1,489 hours in 1998 (Maddison, 
2006: 347). Furthermore, while showing increased working hours may suggest that 
absolute labour time has increased, this does not fully illuminate the degree of success 
that capitalists may have had in extracting absolute surplus value, since variable cost 
(i.e. compensation to employees) is assumed to remain constant. In order to represent 
the strongest case for a countertendency theory of recovery, therefore, it may be 
useful to look at a better method of measuring whether absolute surplus value has 
grown, such as unpaid labour time as a ratio to paid labour time (Ibid., 427). 
 
 
This ratio shows the rising or constant actual time worked measured against declining 
or stagnating employee compensation, allowing us to compare two periods of time; 
one from the just after the Golden age of capitalism and another during the onset of 
the ‘Great Moderation’. It is in the latter period in which the new class project of US 
capitalists are said to have succeeded in restoring the rate of profit through extracting 
a greater amount of surplus value, and thus demonstrate a greater disproportion 
between the number hours worked and the compensation received than with the 
former period (Kliman, 2015: 289). The data suggests that this is not only not the 
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case, but that it is in fact in the later period where there is a closing between hours 
worked by labour and the amount of compensation they receive, meaning there is on 
average less absolute surplus value create. Between 1969 and 1979 hours actually 
worked by employees ranged from 42-43 hours, while the actual hours paid for 
ranged between 35-37 hours. From 1993 to 2003, however, actual worked hours by 
labour had decreased and ranged from 33 to 34, while the time they were actually 
compensated for remained steady at 34 hours (ILO, 2016: 77-78). 
 
 
The data presented on absolute surplus value seems to indicate, therefore, that 
capitalists did not recover their rate of profit by extending the hours of workers for 
labour post 1970. Yet as has been discussed, there has been another prominent 
countertendency that Marxists have pointed to as helping to induce economic 
recovery through restoring the profit rate; acquiring greater relative surplus value and 
an ongoing repression of the real wage. Writers have suggested that US capitalists 
began to see labour as the source of decline in their rates of return on capital, 
attacking the strength of trade union, the growth and stickiness of wages and the lack 
of labour discipline and flexibility (Duménil and Lévy, 2011: 8-9; Harman, 2009: 
192; 194). When the 1970s saw the arrival of the first global economic crisis in the 
post war period, capitalists and a growing voice of politicians and economist pointed 
to the gains labour had made in the post war period as the source (Harman, 2009: 192; 
194, Moseley, 2013: 472-473). 
 
 
In the context of this climate and the rising competition from Germany and Japan, it 
was expected that, in order for the US to return to it’s previous levels of growth, 
labour needed to work harder and faster on the job. This has resulted, it is argued, in a 
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‘speeding up’ of the production process within US capitalism and the ‘squeezing’ of 
all the surplus value out of workers that can be possibly squeezed (Duman, 2014: 245; 
Kotz, 2012: 252; 254-255 Moseley, 2013: 473). As evidence of this trend, 
countertendency theorists typically point to the decline in the real wage despite large 
increases in labour productivity, indicating labour is working harder for less; acting as 
parallel mechanisms to lower the cost of variable capital. (Duman, 2014: 246; 
Moseley, 2013: 473). 
 
 
Economists such as Bakir (2015: 390; 398) have argued that these strategies to 
recover the rate of profit became increasingly exerted as neoliberalism shifted the 
approach to capital accumulation, resulting in a ‘super exploitation’ of labour. This 
can be best illustrated by dividing the American post-WWII period into three business 
cycles, a period of Keynesian compromise, a transitional period and a Neoliberal 
period. What is clear through these three periods, argues Bakir, is the expansion of the 
gap between the productive output of labour and it’s real wage. Starting from 
Keynesian era 1947-1979, labour’s average productivity to wage ratio was 0.9. As US 
capitalists begin to enforce a quicker production process at the start of the 1980s, the 
transitional period, the average ratio rose to 1.06. Finally, in an era of ‘neoliberal 
hegemony’, the ratio rose to 1.21 in the 1990s and 1.37 in the 2000s (Bakir, 2015: 
395). 
 
 
The argument provided by these countertendency theorists concerning the recovery in 
the profit rate is coherent and logical, yet the analysis is once again problematized 
when examining the data that Bakir and others use to represent the changing power 
relationship of labour and capital. The real wage is measured using the data taken 
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from a category within the US National Accounts called ‘Wages and Salaries’. This 
encompasses monetary payment given to employees in exchange for labour, and also 
includes ‘in kind earnings’ provided by employers such as meals, subsides and 
housing. While this category encompasses 80 per cent of earnings by employees, it 
excludes the measure that makes up the entirety of employee compensation. This is 
referred to as ‘supplements to wages and salaries’, and includes employer 
contributions to pension and healthcare plans, as well as employer contributions to 
government social security programs. (BEA, 2007: 11; 14). To exclude it, therefore, 
is to not recognise the total cost of variable capital for capitalists. 
 
 
When the total compensation of employees is taken into account and examined next 
to productivity, the argument that the recovery of capitalism of capitalism after the 
1970s was based on the increased exploitation of labour becomes less tenable. 
Authors such as Kliman (2009) have looked at the growth rate of compensation for 
employees and compared it to the net value added by each American business to 
GDP, a preferred method by economists for calculating labour productivity (Cobet 
and Wilson, 2002: 52). It is also the data that Bakir (2015: 406-407) uses to draws 
conclusions on productivity, making it useful for comparison. Kliman’s calculations, 
adjusting the current-cost figures for inflation, found that overall growth rates of both 
compensation and productivity matched one another in the US economy for the 
period 1947 to 2007. 
 
 
The reason for this has been that supplements to wages and salaries have increased in 
tandem with the level of productivity. For example, health insurance and pension 
benefits, which compromise 65 per cent of total supplements to salaries and wages, 
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were extended by employers by around 19 percentage points for the same time period 
(BEA, 2016; Kliman, 2015: 306 see endnote 3). Still, while the level of compensation 
for US workers has continued to grow in order to match output it has never exceeded 
output, in essence remaining ‘trendless’ (Kliman, 2010: 5-6). Regardless, the data 
suggests that the argument that capitalists have pushed for greater labour productivity 
in order to redeem a higher rate of profit does not seem to apply, at least when 
looking at the development of the largest capitalist economy. Furthermore, this data 
on employee compensation also poses a problem for an associated explanation of how 
the profit rate recovered after the 1970 economic collapse ⎯as well as the third 
countertendency mentioned by Marx (1993a: 340). 
 
 
Authors such as Duman (2014:246) and Duménil and Lévy (2011: 8) claim that the 
post 1970s is when capitalists began to put pressure on labour by suppressing the real 
wage, ‘working to the benefit of highest income brackets, capitalist owners, and the 
upper fractions of management’. From 1982 the average income of the 1 per cent 
began to increase dramatically, rising to an average of $550,000 per household by 
1985, an increase of about 45 per cent. While there were some periods of torpidity 
and retraction of these gains during the 90s, the overall trend in income was upwards, 
reaching just under an average of $1000,0000 by 2007, or an increase for the top 1% 
of income of another 45%. Meanwhile, the vast majority of American households saw 
their income oscillate from 1970 to the early 1990s between the sums of $37,000 and 
$34,000. It was only starting from the 1990s the latter households saw their income 
rise again, peaking at $44,000 dollars during the 2000s. While retractors such as 
Kliman (2015: 289) recognizes there has been an increase in inequality in the USA, it 
is retorted that this is still compatible with the data showing that compensation for 
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workers has remained equal to output, although this inequality has been 
misinterpreted due to a failure to recognize changing household composition and 
taxation. Still, the data suggests that to the degree that there has been an increase in 
income inequality, this has not been for the benefit of capitalists but for other 
labourers within the working class (Kliman, 2015: 293). 
 
 
It should be noted that while the data suggests that capitalists did not retrieve their 
prior rate of profit through increasing absolute and relative surplus value, or through 
suppressing variable costs within production, the data does demonstrate that costs for 
labour did not increase at prior levels. Had the growth of compensation continued to 
match its trend between 1948 and 1973, worker compensation today would be 36 to 
53 per cent higher (Kliman, 2010: 69). This could suggest, therefore, that capitalists 
have been successful at repressing costs of production from rising post 1970s (in the 
US economy atleast). Regardless, this still needs to explain why the profit rate 
recovered, making it necessary to find other explanations for how capitalism found 
solutions to it’s economic contradiction, specifically, looking at the notion of ‘capital 
destruction’. 
 
 
Marx admits that while countertendencies are possible instruments for the recovery of 
a declining rate of profit, they have an inherent limit in their application due to natural 
human inhibitions. For example, while one worker may increase the intensity of their 
labour to do work previously done by three (thereby allowing a capitalist to either sell 
more commodities or reduce variable capital costs) this one worker will produce less 
surplus value doing this task than had the three workers done it, since they can only 
work so hard (Marx 1991:342). Nor can humans work forever, meaning increases in 
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absolute surplus value can only go so far. Furthermore, while counterfactors may in 
the short term rejuvenate the rate of profit, they also help maintain and expand the 
existing mass of fixed capital, which in the long term means capitalist production will 
maintain low rates of profitability, even if it is rising in short periods (Carchedi, 
2011). What is necessary to restore profit rates in this context is for the current stock 
of fixed capital to be removed or destroyed, thereby enabling capitalist the incentive 
to return to successful accumulation. This particular mechanism is the second 
foundation from which a Marxian theory of recovery may be established and is, 
therefore, what the next section will be concerned with. 
 
 
 
The Destruction of Capital and the Recovery in the Rate of Profit 
 
 
When countertendencies such as the extension of absolute and relative surplus value 
have reached there limits, Marx argues, and constant capital has therefore begun to 
grow in ever larger proportions to variable capital, advanced capital will begin to 
produce either the same or lesser amount of absolute surplus value than it had 
previously before it grew, there will be an ‘absolute overproduction of capital’ (Marx, 
2015: 360). With capitalist production in this state, Marx asks, how is a “‘healthy’ 
movement of capitalist production to be restored?”. The answer is: “already implicit 
in the way in which the conflict is stated. It involves this: that capital should be 
destroyed…[and] under all circumstances, the balance will be restored by [this] 
annihilation of capital”(emphases in original, Marx, 2015: 362). In both Capital 
Volume III and Theories of Surplus Value, Marx outlines what this destruction looks 
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like and how it forms the foundation for capitalist recovery. Marx refers to two 
specific destruction processes in particular. 
 
 
The first instance of destruction is the physical dissolution to the factors of production 
that occurs when reproduction is stopped or restricted by a capitalist before it can 
proceed, thereby removing them from the context of the capitalist social relation 
(Marx, 1951: 372). When a machine that was originally meant to form part of a 
capitalist’s reproduction process is no longer going to be used to its full extent or at 
all, this is halting the material thing from becoming part of the capitalist social 
relation. At Marx (ibid) puts it, ‘machinery which is not used is not capital. Labour 
which is not exploited is equivalent to lost production…commodities which rot in 
warehouses⎯ all of this is destruction of capital’. As Marx colorfully posits, the use 
and exchange values of these potential or restricted inputs therefore ‘go to the devil’. 
 
 
The second process of destruction is what occurs to materials such as commodities 
that have already gone through the production process. A time of economic crisis will 
cause commodities to depreciate in value, inhibiting their ability to renew the 
reproduction process on the same scale at a later stage within production (Marx, 1951: 
373). If a capitalist, for example, creates a quantity of commodities in the production 
process at the cost of $12,000, but this quantity of commodities is only able to be sold 
for $6000 due to declining prices, this will not be enough money capital to establish 
another round of reproduction, meaning the capitalist will go bankrupt.6 (Marx, 1951: 
372). It is in this way that the exchange value of commodities is destroyed. 
 
6 This also assumes that the capitalist would not have access to a loan from financial capital, 
which is not an unlikely scenario during an economic crisis. 
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Both kinds of destruction outlined above are essential for restoring the rate of profit 
thereby inducing another round of capitalist reproduction. In the first instance, 
whereby the factors of production are removed from the reproduction process, it is 
possible for a reset in sector growth. The previous ratio of fixed capital to variable 
capital has been abolished, and capitalists can now engage in a new stage of 
production without the limitations caused by a low rate of profit. A good example of 
this kind of destruction was seen during World War II, in which physical capital was 
broken up and destroyed in a variety of ways, such as through the redirection of 
industries to the war economy or through the bombing and conquering of industrial 
centers by enemy nations (Cook, 2002: 131). In the second instance of destruction, 
however, while the exchange value of capital is dissolved, its use value remains in 
tact since the social necessary labour time embodied within it has remained the same 
while only its monetary form has changed. Other capitalists who acquire this capital 
below its true use value from bankrupt capitalists will have incentive to engage in a 
new series of production, since their inputs have been acquired at such cheap costs, 
allowing them to pass these savings on within the reproduction process, giving them a 
high rate of profit. 
 
 
Though here are a number of theoretical and empirical issues with a Marxian theory 
of recovery, restricted space allows only for the consideration of one pertinent point 
from both the former and latter fields . Firstly, while the above summary of Marx’s 
theory of destruction gives the basic foundations for what must occur within 
capitalism for it to begin to recover from a crisis, it is naturally susceptible to the 
charge of oversimplification and abstraction. There is, for example, no mention of the 
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role of financialisation or the state within this overview of capitalist destruction. Yet, 
as has been discussed in detail in Chapter 2, putting the theory in these basic terms is 
necessary for the current level of analysis we are engaged with. At the ‘general’ and 
‘abstract’ it is possible to discuss broad patterns that occur across the world economy 
without accounting for every specific instance that contradicts this pattern (Marx: 
1993b: 237). The specific role destruction has had in helping capitalism recover 
within the 19th and 20th century will be discussed in the next and two final chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Capital Destruction and Economic 
Recovery in the Late 19th and Early 20th 
Century 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Chapter 3 concluded that capital destruction provided the best grounds from which a 
Marxian theory of economic recovery could be made. Yet Marx’s exposition of the 
concept was limited, having restricted his analysis to the abstract and general. Chapter 
4, along with Chapter 5, will attempt to reveal the more concrete elements of capital 
destruction, examining its place in the cyclical and secular recovery of the US 
economy. In light of this empirical investigation in Chapter 4 and 5, some initial 
conclusions about the relation capital destruction has with the capitalist state will be 
highlighted in preparation for a return to a theoretical analysis in the final chapter, 
Chapter 6. 
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The Economic Cycle 1870-1900 
 
 
Before the beginning of the 20th century, a large degree of capital devalorisation was 
occurring in the US economy. Between 1857 and 1870, the number of annual 
commercial failures did not exceed 6,993. By 1871, however, bankruptcies began to 
increase annually, reaching a peak by 1878 of 10,474. This increase receded for a 
period of 5 years, but again expanded to 9,184 commercial failures by 1883. The rest 
of the 19th century did not see failures go below 9,337, moving as high as 15,242 in 
1893. (DOC, 1906: 561). It is likely that much depreciated capital was also acquired 
during this period, since it was during this time that mergers and acquisitions reached 
an unprecedented high, leaving American industry to become dominated by 
monopolies and economic historians to name this period ‘The Great Merger Wave’ 
(O’Brien, 2013: 32).This ‘wave’ had begun by 1870, and while corporate mergers had 
reached a trough by 1890 of below 100 businesses, they once again shot up to a 
record high of over 1000 by 1898, shown in the diagram below. 
 
 
The degree of destruction was likely due to the start in the secular decline of the rate 
of profit which had also begun at the start of 1870 and even earlier than that for 
dominant capitalist economy of the time the UK. As stated in Marxian theory, this 
decline would be driven by disproportionate investment in fixed capital relative to 
labour power, leading to a decreased rate of surplus value from which capitalists can 
acquire profit. While the level of the organic composition of capital (the name Marx 
gives to the relation between the two types of capital) is difficult to measure due to 
this period’s limitations of data reliability (as discussed in Chapter 2), economists 
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have noted the large influx of technological innovations taking place at this time, an 
indication of the displacement of labour power. As O’Brien (2013: 32) notes: 
 
 
To take a striking example, in the early 1880s, a worker 
could produce 3,000 cigarettes per day by hand. In 1882, 
James Bonsack patented a cigarette-making machine that 
could produce 120,000 cigarettes per day… 
 
 
This ongoing drop in the rate of profit would not be sufficiently resolved until the 
Great Depression of 1930, and is indicative of the long term and indirect effects that a 
secular declining rate of profit, especially its effects on rates of economic growth 
through dampening accumulation (Freeman, 2015: 74-75; Kliman, 2010: 17; Shaikh, 
118). This point will be returned in this chapter’s section on the Great Depression. 
 
 
Returning to the late 19th century, capitalists expanded investment into constant 
capital at the expense of variable capital, which saw average profit rates fall, moving 
from above 0.2 percent to below 0.1 percent between 1870-1898 (Li, et al., 2007: 39). 
At this time, dominant capitalist industries saw an opportunity to end competition by 
removing fellow capitalists, incentivized by a number of benefits; one being removing 
the need to dedicate the majority of capital returns to future investment so as not to be 
out innovated in production (Harman, 2010: 61). John D. Rockfellar, the American 
Oil Baron who had a large part in inspiring the Sherman Anti-Trust laws through 
underhanded business strategies to create an oil monopoly, captures this periods 
attitude well when he is claimed to have said ‘buy when there’s blood in the streets’⎯ 
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a piece of advice Forbes magazine reiterated to their 21st century readers as an 
 
example of ‘how millionaires become billionaires’ (Rapoza, 2012).7 
 
 
It is in this time period that we first take account of the state’s relation to this sudden 
expansion of capital destruction and the results it had for the evolution of the US 
capitalist mode of production. The monopolization that had begun in the 1870s and 
resulted in the large expansion of bankruptcies did not go without socio-political 
consequences for the capital class, occurring at the same time as an expansion in 
worker radicalism in the US, along with more moderate reaction abroad in England, 
Germany and France (Arrighi and Silver, 1999: 181; Hillard, 2010: 56) This period 
saw the beginning of the first strike action as well as the creation of the first unions 
and worker political parties (Hillard, 2010: 56). For example, while the early part of 
the 19th century rarely saw strikes and lockout action by workers exceed over 500 
within a year, the period 1884 to 1900 saw the average number of strikes and lockouts 
expand to 1,365 annually (Mitchell, 1993: 114). This class backlash helped contribute 
to the state’s intervention in 1890 with the Sherman Act, legislation that gave the 
government the power to break up firms that formed trusts. In part, the intention of 
the Sherman Act was to help protect from a consequence of capital destruction, i.e. 
monopolisation; a threat to the American social contract of a ‘free market’ (Panitch 
and Gindin, 2012: 26-27)8. As the introduction to the Sherman Act states, its 
 
 
7 While this was the general attitude of capitalists towards monopolisation during the late 19th 
century, this is not always the case. As Branston et al’s (2014) research indicates, times of 
recession often see capitalists collude to the mutual benefit of one another, subsequently 
increasing the degree of monopoly. 
8 Whether it was also originally intended to subvert collective action by workers is difficult to 
assess, but the act was nonetheless used by capital to do so. This was the case in 1901 where 
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legislative effect is to show ‘policy favouring a competitive, free enterprise economy 
unencumbered by unreasonable or monopolistic restriction on free market forces’. It 
is, the act concludes the ‘guiding principles for competitive economic behaviour’ 
(Kintner, 1978: 7). Though the legislative act by the government would later come be 
seen to be ineffective in its enforcement, leading to pressure from both small business 
and the public for further intervention by government, it momentarily helped repeal 
calls for action (Vietor, 2000: 973). 
 
By the state promoting the Sherman Act it served to legitimize the discursive frame 
that the economic cycle of boom and slump was a natural process; something to be 
weathered by society, rather than something to be resisted or prevented⎯ a notion that 
has moved in and out of popular discourse to this day (Bordo and Haubrich, 2012: 1; 
Claeys and Bruegel, 2015). The unemployment, real wage cuts and general price 
rises etc that may come with economic crisis and the move to recovery through 
capital destruction, all of these consequences were to be persevered (albeit 
temporarily) until things could return to prosperity, to ‘go on in the old way’ (Jessop, 
2013: 240-241). Yet while the Sherman Act served to reinforce the ideological 
legitimacy of American capitalism, it did not serve to relieve the material reality of 
monopolisation and centralisation of capital, as the ongoing mergers and acquisitions 
of this period suggest (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 27-28). The period after 1870 thus 
saw the genesis and development of a contradiction between the material reality of 
US capitalism and its idealized conception. This contradiction, when fully realised in 
the Great Depression, would serve to challenge the viewpoint held by the state and 
 
 
 
Loewe and Company sued the United Hatters of North America union under the act in 
response to organised strikes and boycotts against the business. 
 56 
thus see it evolve its nature regarding crisis and recovery managment. Before then, 
however, we see the precedent of its change in the 1907 banking crisis. 
 
 
The Economic Crisis of 1907 
 
 
Initially, the beginning of the 20th Century saw a retrieval in the rate of profit for the 
US economy, moving from an average rate of 13.5 per cent for the period 1895-99 to 
14.5 per cent in 1900-04. The latter period had seen an increase in the amount of 
American bankruptcies and mergers and acquisitions, indicating the role played by 
capital destruction in this general recovery. Despite this, however, 1907 saw a stock 
market panic which was followed by a recession. This financial crisis seemingly 
contradicts the premise that the LTROPF is a determinate factor in capitalism’s 
reoccurring economic crises, as well as the main position of this thesis that the 
mechanism of capital destruction builds the foundations from which economic 
recovery springs. There does, however, appear to be two potentially legitimate 
explanations for the onset of economic crisis in this context, with either one or both 
being true. 
 
 
Firstly, while the relation between capital destruction and economic recovery that 
while the US rate of profit had been expanding in this cyclical period, its secular trend 
had been down wards. As stated, the period 1900-04 saw the ROP reach 14.5 per cent, 
yet this is a 9.8 per cent decline from its previous level of 24.3 per cent in the 1880- 
84. A lower rate of profit has destabilizing effects on an economy making it more 
prone to crisis, even if it has seen its rate of profit increase over a recent period 
(Kliman, 2009: 17-19; Li, 2016: 174). This point will be expanded upon when the 
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discussion reaches the Great Depression, as this is where the secular trend in the rate 
of profit becomes especially clear and significant for the US economy and global 
capitalism. The second explanation lies in the significance of the US rate of profit in 
this point in time for the world capitalist economy. While the US was on its way to 
becoming a fully developed capitalist nation, it had yet not fully surpassed the UK yet 
in economic hegemony, which would remain ‘the nerve center of world commerce 
and finance’ until the beginning of World War I (Arrighi and Silver, 1999: 181). 
 
 
This meant while its own rate of profit was significant to its own and the world’s 
economy, it was also, like other developing capitalist nations, more prone to the 
consequences of ROP falls within other capitalist economies, especially more 
dominant ones such as the UK, whose rate of profit fell significantly for this period 
from 30.9 per cent between 1895-99 to 27.1 in 1900-04 (Aliber and Kindleberger, 
2005: 108; Li et al., 2007: 36-37). This idea is supported further when considering 
that a similar recovery was not present in the world rate of profit, which fell by 2.1 
per cent. Furthermore, in the lead up to the 1907 financial crisis panic, bankruptcies 
rose from 9,337 by 1905 to 11,721 by the year of the panic when there was a run on 
US banks. 
 
 
The US state’s initial response to the 1907 crisis was to let it run its course, with 
many economists and bankers reassuring state officials that the 19th century had 
shown that crashes appeared at regular intervals every 10 years, and that this was a 
normal cyclical stage for the economy on its way back to economic boom (Koenig, 
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2014: 338)9. As with previous financial panics, it was believed that if a bank were 
unable to provide sufficient liquidity, they could give depositors a clearinghouse 
certificate; a form of currency substitute that was backed by the pooled American 
banknotes of a group of banks (Aliber and Kindleberger, 2005: 185). Yet despite this 
generally accepted dichotomy within government and capital officialdom that busts 
were an unfortunate though regular part of business cycles, the 1907 recession reveals 
the continuing change brought by capitalism’s developing social relations, that is the 
inhibition of the state to let the process of capital devalorisation go too far, especially 
in the context of a newly awakened class consciousness amongst labour. 
 
 
Thus, while the state’s initial response was minimal, when one of the largest 
commercial banks, J.P. Morgan, allowed the Knickerbocker Trust to go into 
bankruptcy, despite it holding $50 million worth of deposits for 17,000 depositors, it 
became clear as the crisis proceeded that oncoming collapse of various financial 
institutions, who had loaned money with poor securities, would have a contagious 
effect on the rest of the financial market (Chernow, 1990, pp. 123-5; Panitch and 
Gindin, 2012: 42) While the state still only interfered at arms-length, providing $25 
million to J.P. Morgan who was then to dispense this liquidity to other major financial 
institutions of Wall Street, it was still against the dominant perspective at the time of 
letting market destruction run its course (Chernow, 1990, pp. 123-5). Indeed, this 
same form of action was taken with the 1890 crisis, and the response to the 1907 
crisis seems to have reaffirmed a principle, as well as establishing policy based 
 
9 Economic views on this were not homogenous, with many pushing for stronger action and 
greater State oversight along with the formation of a central bank. As discussed below, this 
would only gain popularity amongst the State and public after the 1907 panic (Caporale, 
2003: 312). 
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precedent (and that would be more strongly adopted by the state with the onset of the 
Great Depression) that despite the reticence to interfere with ‘liberty and freedom’ 
that came with the free market, the process of destructive recovery was concerning 
enough to capitalism’s social relation for the state that it acted to stop it (Arrighi and 
Silver, 1999: 67). 
 
 
1907-1914 
 
 
The 1907 crisis had finally pushed the American state to realize that the stability of 
the financial system could no longer rely on a singular capitalist agent (i.e. J.P. 
Morgan) to rally their class together during times of crisis in order to ensure the 
reproduction of the system (Chernow, 1990: 131). Greater systematic control over the 
economy was needed, and this pressure regalvanised calls for a central banking 
system, which had been ongoing since the 1870s (Caporale, 2003: 311). Emerging 
from these calls, the National Monetary Commission recommended legislation for the 
formation of a Central Bank to be called the Federal Reserve. As Paul Warburg (one 
of the key actors in forming the legislation to be called the Federal Reserve Act) 
stated, the Federal Reserve’s purpose was not only to supervise liquidity, money 
creation and credit, but to establish a ‘fusion of financial and government power’ over 
the economy (quoted in Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 43). The Federal Reserve would be 
the ‘bankers bank’, providing discounted loans during times of crisis, thereby 
ensuring economic stability by being a lender of last resort (Hawtrey, 1922: 227; 
Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 43). 
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While the Federal Reserve has likely played an important role in the history of capital 
destruction, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine this in its entirety, though 
the institution’s role to capitalism’s endogenous recovery mechanism will be returned 
to in greater detail when Global Financial Crisis of 2008 is discussed in Chapter 5. 
Despite this, it’s birth is an important milestone to note. This is because it illuminates 
an understanding not only of the evolution of the state’s expanding role in the US 
economy, but also the emerging expectation and even reliance put on the state by 
capital to intervene within the market to ensure that capitalist’s reproduction could 
continue to occur. 
 
 
While recovery from the 1907 financial panic was a comparatively swift relative to 
past economic crises, the events impact on the economy, as well as its demonstration 
that capitalists in the free market were unable to resolve the crisis, led to the creation 
of the Federal Reserve. In part, this was to reassure financial capital that it would have 
a state body to turn too when crisis struck. Thus, when the US fell into recession at 
the end of 1914, after the Great War had been declared by the European powers, there 
was enough reassurance provided by the Fed to ensure that gold convertibility did not 
have to be suspended as had occurred previously in the 1907 panic and other past 
crises (Rockoff, 2004: 4). Still, the US state’s role within capitalist production by the 
time of Great War was still limited. For example, it made no move to interfere in 
helping the economy recover during this period. Bankruptcies increased to 38 per cent 
between 1913 to 1915, rising from 16036 to 22156. Mergers and Acquisitions also 
increased, moving from an all time low of below 50 a year to above 150 by about 
1917. Yet there was one process of capital destruction that the state (both the US and 
others) began to oversee for the purpose of military victory against other nation- 
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states; this was the conversion of exiting civilian produced capital into war time 
capital (Rockoff, 2008). 
 
 
World War I to 1920 
 
 
By the US entering the first World War only two years before it ended, American 
capitalism already a major rising economic power, could attain a large degree of the 
economic benefits the military conflict and capital destruction provided, 
simultaneously not having to sustain the massive debt or detrimental loss in its supply 
of raw materials, skilled labor population etc that other waring nation-states would 
(Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 43; Rockoff, 2004: 4-5). These benefits included being the 
dominant supplier of food and munitions, commodities that were in high demand with 
European allies (Rockoff, 2004: 4-5). When the war ended, both UK and Germany 
economies had exhausted their accumulated raw materials, capital and human labour. 
Meanwhile, the US capital investment had taken over 50% of global industrial 
production, doubled its exports and became the largest nation-state creditor in the 
world, surpassing Britain, economically at least, as the global capitalist hegemon 
(Harman, 2010: 143; Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 45 ). From the beginning of 1914 
when the war had begun, until the Great Depression of 1929, this expansion into 
industrial production (and which had been fuelled by conflict) facilitated what 
economist Rockoff (2004: 5) has described as a ‘long boom’. US capital was able 
expand this way in part because of the space left behind by domestically destroyed 
capital during the war; but even more significantly, because of the opportunity to 
invest capital abroad (Harman, 2010: 101-102). The expansion of oversea investment 
was made possible in particular through the capital destruction that took place in the 
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two major economies of the UK and Germany, thereby allowing American capitalism 
to assume its previous rate of profit and rate of accumulation which had, as discussed, 
seen a secular decline and had begun to significantly impact the economy after the 
1907 financial panic. 
 
 
Measuring the amount of capital destruction that took place during the war (not just 
the US but the UK and German) is a difficult task due to the lack of empirical studies 
available and the limited national accounting material kept by governments and 
businesses (Broadberry and Harrison, 2005: 1). Fortunately, Broadberry and 
Harrison’s (2005) quantitative study of the conflict provide some illuminating data. 
Their work shows that compared to its pre-war capital, Britain lost 9.9 per cent of its 
domestic assets and 23.9 per cent of its overseas assets, along with 14.9 per cent of its 
national wealth (Broadberry and Harrison 2005: 31, Table 10).10 While for unclear 
reasons, many pieces of data are missing for Germany between the periods 1913 and 
1920, it is known that its reparations bill was 51.6 per cent of its pre-war assets and 
that the nation had lost 54.7 per cent of its national wealth when measured against the 
same ratio (Broadberry and Harrison, 2005: 31; Jánossy 1971: 42). 
 
 
Returning to the US, bankruptcies increases were relatively small, in part due to the 
increased control over the economy by the state, which had begun converting exiting 
civilian produced capital into war time produced capital even before the US entered 
the war in 1917 (Rockoff, 2004: 2). This period, along with the early period of the 
 
 
10 Oversea assets and domestic assets are defined as physical capital, i.e. ‘the conventional 
form of capital, consisting of buildings, equipment and inventories.’ (Broadberry and 
Harrison, 2005: 16). 
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1920s, also saw dominant capitalists provided with the opportunity to centralize their 
control over production and markets, with the US Treasury introducing the Edge Act 
of 1919 which loosened anti-trust laws, allowing a new wave of acquisition of 
commodities and capital stock below their use value, as indicated by mergers and 
acquisitions rebounding from an record trough of below 50 a year to above 150 by 
about 1920 (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 48-49). Despite the US state’s integration into 
the economy and coordination of the market during the war, the prosperity for the 
nation seems to have reaffirmed the notion of the free market’s self-healing properties 
or as Warren G. Harding (1930: 25) noted after the war ended, ‘the world war 
wrought the destruction of healthful competition [and] left our storehouses empty’. 
 
 
This helps explain that when the economic crisis of 1920 did occur, the state persisted 
in justifying the necessity of its social consequences (such as high consumer prices 
and low stagnate wages) as a normal phase of capitalism cyclicity. Indeed, despite the 
large impact to the economy that the crisis imbued, the quickly proceeding recovery 
and subsequent boom in many sectors of the economy, deeply reinforced among 
government officials of the need to allow the market to go through a necessary stage 
of deflation and ‘liquidation’ with the onset of recession so as to pave the way for a 
return to growth and prosperity (Bradford DeLong, 1990: 2) As President Harding 
(1930: 10) made clear at the time, there was ‘no short way out’ and the path of 
recovery was only possible through the further revision of state interference with the 
economy and ‘by exercise of public economy and stimulation of private thrift and by 
revision of war imposed taxes unsuited to peace-time economy’. Even when the 
unemployment rate climbed to 5 million, causing the president to initiate an 
‘unemployment conference’, no monetary relief was offered and discussion went no 
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further than the Federal government advising local government and institutions (e.g. 
charities) to provide relief in ways they best saw fit through existing fund and 
resource avenues (Ferrel, 2014: 64-65). This result may have been predicated on the 
opening remarks made by Harding at the beginning of the talks, claiming that any 
government planning or expenditure to end the crisis would just be ‘excess 
stimulation…to be reckoned a cause of trouble rather than a cure’ (Ferrel, 2014: 65). 
 
 
The Great Depression 
 
 
It was this fundamental assumption about the form of accumulation capitalism must 
take, that helps explain the US state’s policy of non-interference in largest occurrence 
of capital devalorisation during the late 19th and early 20th century. The social 
development of the state was shaped by the material experiences of this time, where 
capitalism had endured economic downturn but would appear to remerge into growth, 
sometimes at stronger rates than before the crisis. This attitude was reinforced by the 
emergence of contemporary economics as a discipline, which was founded on a belief 
that the study of the economy should be devoid of normative frameworks and instead 
be solely dedicated to pursuing and discovering scientific truths, which would be used 
to find the best possible solutions to economic problems (Milonakis and Fine, 2009: 
94). As one of the founders of this school, Léon Walras argued, economics was to be 
applied practically, dealing with ‘what ought to be done from the point of view of 
natural well-being [of the economy]’ and putting aside questions of morality to what 
‘ought to be done from the point of view of justice (quoted in Milonakis and Fine, 
2009: 95). 
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Yet with the decline of the international economic order caused by World War I, 
along with the failure of the UK economy to reassume its previous international 
‘coordinating role’ for capitalist stability due to its own economic decline, the coming 
Great Depression, along with World War II, would demonstrate to the US state that it 
must assume a changing and more integrated role within the capitalist accumulation 
process, thereby ensuring capital’s stability and continuity (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 
48). The Great Depression was the economic crisis that transformed the conventional 
ideological view surrounding the process of capital destruction. Indeed this crisis 
would change not only how the state viewed and dealt with the social consequences 
of capital destruction, but also how it would deal with the devalorisation process 
amongst capitalists. This furthering of the role of the state in managing the 
consequences of contradictory forces that had brought about the crisis would in itself 
hold the foundations of the economic contradiction that beset the economy during the 
rest of the 20th century. This contradiction was the inhibiting the cyclical process of 
capital destruction, the problems of which will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
 
When the economic crisis began in 1929, it was assumed that like previous crises, the 
economic slump would end relatively quickly and thus there was little need for the 
state to intervene in any more direct fashion than it had previously (Bradford De 
Long, 1998: 74-75). As John D. Rockerfellar said, ‘…depressions have come and 
gone. Prosperity has always returned and will again’ (Roberts, 2016:46). And while 
the president at the time of the depression, Herbert Hoover began to adopt more 
activist state policies as the depression continued, such as increased state spending 
and public work programs, Hoover also believed economic stability required 
balancing the state’s budget through increased taxation, ‘The first requirement of 
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confidence and of economic recovery is financial stability of the United states 
Government’ (quoted in Bradford De Long, 1998: 75). While the state debated 
inwardly about the degree of state intervention in the depression, there was a general 
consensus that it was business that would lead the US out of economic recession and 
that in the meantime any economic and social destruction were unavoidable 
(Kennedy, 2001: 116-117). 
 
 
Hoover, having seen the US go through the economic crisis of 1920-1921 while 
Secretary of Commerce, firmly believed it was only capital that ‘possessed the 
flexibility and technical expertise required to stabilize markets’, and that it was this 
‘healing power’ that would return the US economy to recovery (Panitch and Gindin, 
2012: 51). As Hoover made explicit in a private letter, ‘destitution’ was an inevitable 
economic process (Hoover, 1931: 1). Hoover’s own Commerce Secretary at the time, 
Andrew Mellon, believed in a similar economic recovery formula, with destruction 
‘purg[ing] the rottenness out of the system…[allowing] enterprising people to pick up 
the wrecks from less competent people’ (quoted by Hoover in Kliman, 2010: 23). 
Therefore, continued Mellon, ‘liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate farmers 
liquidate real estate’ (Kliman, 2010: 23). 
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Figure 4.1 US Business Failures by Number, 1895-1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: For data between 1895 and 1937 see Richardson and Gou (2011). Data between 
1937-1997 is taken from Lawless and Warren (2005). 
 
 
With the free market allowed to ‘correct’ the imbalances in the economy, a third of all 
American domestic banks went into failure (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 53). As 
demonstrated in Figure 4.1 above, business failures of all kinds reached a peak in 
1932 to 31,882. This was 50.8 percent more devalorisation than occurred during the 
peak of the 1908 panic and 25.7 percent more than the peak of the crisis of the early 
1920s. This amount of bankruptcies would not occur again until the 1980s. The social 
consequences of this capital destruction, among other things, lead to 25% drop in real 
wages and created 25% unemployment by 1933 (Dunn, 2014: 421; Panitch and 
Gindin, 2012: 54). Yet unlike past crises, while there was a period that saw capitalists 
go bankrupt, with their accumulated surplus value being absorbed by other capitalists, 
there was no subsequent period of reignited production on the scale that had matched 
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previous accumulation. This is generally recognised as a period of economic 
stagnation, defined as when economic growth after a slump does not reach previous 
growth levels for another 10 to 15 years (Roberts, 2016: 11). To better understand 
why the devalorisation mechanism of recovery did not produce a subsequent 
recovery, this thesis must return to a more detailed examination of the one of the main 
contributors to economic crisis, this being the trend in the rate of profit (ROP). As 
noted, the LTROPF is a highly controversial and debated explanation for economic 
crisis (see Dunn, 2011: 536-540 for an account of common critiques). While not all 
problems can be addressed surrounding the theory due to their breadth and lack of 
direct relevance, some specific issues that relate directly to the law’s empirical 
application to America’s economic history can be discussed. 
 
 
Explaining the Stagnation: The Secular Rate of Profit and the Great 
Depression- A Brief Return to Theory 
 
Some writers have rejected the notion that the rate of profit has been a major systemic 
determinant in causing economic crises throughout US history, instead seeing it as 
one economic factor among many that can but is not always the major contradiction 
of capitalist production. Duménil and Lévy (2011:33), for example, estimate the rate 
of profit was in fact recovering before the beginning of the Great Depression and thus 
indicates it was not fundamentally responsible for the crisis nor the subsequent 
stagnation. Yet when actually examined, Duménil and Lévy interpretation of their 
own data is less equivocal than they suggest. Looking at five-year averages in the 
ROP for the US economy shows that in the periods from 1920-1924 to 1925-1929, the 
profit rate did indeed increase its average from 14.8% to 15.3% (Maito, 2014: 19, 
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Table 2). Roberts (2016: 53) argues the rate of profit also began falling 5 years prior 
to the Great Depression, recovering briefly before 1929, then declining dramatically 
to its lowest levels in the same year.11 This is demonstrated from the rate of profit 
calculations made by Duménil and Lévy (1993) in Table 4.1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 Both Maito (2014) and Roberts (2016) are utilizing Duménil and Lévy (2011) data. 
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Table 4.1 - Duménil and Lévy 
Rate of Profit Calculations for 
the US Economy 
1920 25.7% 
1921 23.9% 
1922 23.3% 
1923 26.5% 
1924 30.6% 
1925 28.3% 
1926 28.4% 
1927 25.3% 
1928 24.9% 
1929 27.8% 
1930 21.5% 
Source: (Duménil and Lévy, 1993: 356) 
 
 
As Duménil and Lévy’s interpretation of Marx’s LTROPF shows, there is a 
perception that for the rate of profit to be seen as the cause of economic crises, it must 
be declining in the immediate year before the latter occurs. Marx was never explicit 
about the direct mechanics behind the law, and other writers have rejected this notion 
presented by Duménil and Lévy, arguing what is more significant is the ‘indirect’ 
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impact the secular decline in the ROP has on an economy (Kliman, 2010:13; 
Freeman, 2015: 78). This is not to deny that the law has no cyclical impact. It is 
simply acknowledging that focusing only on US’s short term ROP would be to ignore 
the empirical reality of its long-term decline (a trend that has also been occurring in 
the other major developed capitalist economies) and the relationship this has with the 
economic reproduction of capitalism. Recent arguments put forward by Kliman 
(2010) and Freeman (2016) suggest this secular view better reflects Marx’s perception 
of capitalist development and the development of its economic relations. To help 
grasp the dynamics of this long-term relation the US ROP has with economic crisis 
and capital devalorisation, an brief examination of the data is given below. 
 
 
Table 4.2 is an incomplete replication of Maito (2014) data which attempts to 
formulate a world rate of profit. From the period 1855 to 1944, it shows the average 
trend in the ROP from seven core countries12 in five year averages. Table 4.2 also 
shows the separated averages for the US and UK for the same period. 
 
 
Table 4.2 The Rate of Profit in Core Capitalist Countries, 1855- 
 
1944 (Four Year Averages) 
Year Core Countries U.S.A U.K. 
1855-59 50,4% N/A 30,6% 
1860-64 47,8% N/A 33,5% 
1865-69 44,8% 21,5% 32,2% 
1870-74 40,6% 22,6% 31,7% 
 
 
 
12 Germany, USA, Netherlands, Japan, UK, Sweden and Argentina. 
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1875-79 37,5% 25,1% 27,8% 
1880-84 37,5% 24,3% 28,1% 
1885-89 35,8% 12,3% 30,1% 
1890-94 33,7% 10,2% 29,0% 
1895-99 32,1% 13,5% 30,9% 
1900-04 30,2% 14,5% 27,1% 
1905-09 29,5% 14,8% 27,2% 
1910-14 29,5% 10,8% 27,8% 
1915-19 29,6% 14,1% 26,3% 
1920-24 25,1% 14,8% 15,5% 
1925-29 24,2% 15,3% 21,2% 
1930-34 18,4% 5,8% 19,6% 
1935-39 23,3% 12,4% 23,0% 
1940-44 26,5% 25,4% 28,5% 
Source: (Maito, 2014) 
 
 
Table 4.2 demonstrates a clear long-term decline in the rate of profit, both for the 
entirety of the core capitalist countries, as well as for the US and UK.13 This data 
demonstrates that while in the short cyclical periods the rate of profit may increase, 
 
13 Many article have provided calculations for the long term rate of profit (aka rates of return 
for capital) for countries both developed and developing, but few have attempted to provide a 
world rate of profit calculation (e.g. Bakir, 2015; Bakir and Campbell 2009; Branston et al. 
2014; Chou et al. 2016; Finger, 2012; Giacché, 2012; Jones, 2016; Kliman, 2011; Kotz, 2012; 
Li, 2016; Mateo, 2016) 
Li, Xiao and Zhu (2007), one of the few other authors who have attempted a world rate of 
profit, find similar results to Maito (2014), though with stronger short-term cyclical 
recoveries. 
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it’s secular trend is downwards.14 What is more, these cyclical increases in the rate of 
profit seem to largely follow economic crisis and slumps and the subsequent 
destruction of capital that these crises produce. So, in US, the period encompassing 
the 1907 crisis sees the profit rate move from 14.5% to 14.8%, the period covering the 
1913-14 crisis and the Great War sees a move from 10.8% to 14.1% and the 1920 
crisis move from 14.1% to 14.8%. The UK follows a similar cyclical pattern up until 
the Great War, with the cost of the latter devastating its economy, and allowing other 
capitalist competitors, especially the US, to outcompete it in the world market. The 
UK thus forgo its dominant place in world industrial production and along with it the 
absorption of the mass of surplus value (Broadberry and Harrison, 2005; Crafts, 2014; 
Harman, 2010: 143). As will be discussed further in this chapter, after the Great 
Depression and World War II, the profit rate would recover significantly, but repeat 
its secular decline as the 20th century continued. The consequences to economic 
growth that low profitability causes, as well as its relationship the latter has with 
economic crisis is discussed below. This discussion will also help illuminate in 
Chapter 5 why the US state and capital accumulation responded the ways in which 
they did post Great Depression. 
 
 
The Low Rate of Profit and Capital Devalorisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 The distinction between the effects a secular and cyclical rate of profit has been made 
explicit by a number of academics, e.g. Roberts (2009, P. 41) Bakir (2015: 389-390), for 
example, sees fit to make a distinction between the effects of the secular rate of profit and the 
cyclical rate of profit when examining the Great Recession of 2007. 
 74 
Examining the secular trend in the profit rate is a helpful economic indicator and 
framework from which to understand why the US economy went into crisis in 1929 
and why the normal devalorisation process was not followed by a subsequent period 
of economic growth but instead economic stagnation. While capital destruction may 
help recover the rate of profit, if the rate of profit is already relatively low, only a 
significant amount of destruction may return it back to a rising rate. There are two 
possible reasons for this. Firstly, the rate of profit is low due to the high ratio of the 
technical composition of capital (TCC), i.e. a greater level of constant capital within 
production than variable capital. While a degree of constant capital may be destroyed 
in each successive business cycle, the ongoing low rate of profit demonstrates that 
enough is never sufficiently destroyed than to offer a few years of economic 
accumulation before another economic crisis reoccurs. The TCC, therefore, 
successively rises to a higher level than before each business cycle. This correlates 
with the concentration of capital, since those capitalists with greater competitive 
resources will be able to outcompete smaller capitalists, while still retaining a low rate 
of profit. The other reason for devalorisation being unable to work in the context of an 
economy with a low rate of profit is the effects low profitability will have on the 
ability for capital to accumulate, in particular through affecting aggregate demand, 
specifically business investment. 
 
 
If the rate of profit in an economy is persistently low the incentive for capital to 
engage in new investment will be low. This relationship is recognised even by 
orthodox economic theory, with institution such as the IMF agreeing that there is 
significant connection between investment and growth, one following the other 
(Freeman, 2015: 74; Blanchard 2015). Governor of the Bank of England Mark Carney 
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listed the ‘profit outlook’ (along with ‘uncertainty’ and ‘demand’) as one of the prime 
determinants of ongoing corporate investment, arguing that central banks in all 
economies can only help ‘belated investment recovery’ by structural reforms that 
increase the effects of monetary policy on profit expectations (Carney, 2017: 4). Still, 
some writers have recognised there has been a persistent failure within mainstream 
economics (and even more heterogenous fields such as ‘modern’ political economics) 
to recognize the fundamental significance the rate of profit has in its relation between 
aggregate demand, economic growth and recessions (Roberts, 2016: 8; Treeck, 2008: 
371-372). In his assessment of these relations, Roberts (2016: 14-16), overviewing 
some of the empirical economic literature in this field, argues that ‘the movement of 
profits leads the movement of investment, not vice versa’. For example, Josè A. Tapia 
Granados, an economist who conducted empirical research into the investment-profit 
causative relationship found that: 
 
 
data from 251 quarters of the US economy show that recessions are 
preceded by declines in profits. Profits stop growing and start falling 
four or five quarters before a recession. They strongly recover 
immediately after the recession (Tapia Granados, 2013: 247) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kliman’s (2011: 91) finds ‘variations in the rate of profit account for 83 percent of 
variations in the rate of accumulation of the following year’. 
The Bank for International Settlements find similar results through a correlative 
analysis of economic variables in G7 economies between 1990-2014, concluding also 
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that firms engaged in investment behaviour based on future profit expectations 
(Banerjee et al., 2015: 75-76). 
 
 
Roberts (2016:15) concludes that these and other empirical studies show profit as an 
economic variable ‘swamp’ the economic and predictive effects of other variables 
(e.g. interest rates, credit spreads). This is not to deny that other variables should not 
be unaccounted for, or that there are not exceptions to this analytical conclusion. 
Keynes, built his entire economic theory of capitalism from an analysis that 
investment demand drove production, and he has been followed by a legion of 
academics, in particular post-Keynesians and Kaleckians, who continue to reaffirm 
this analysis as empirically accurate (Lavoie, 2009: 54; Sardoni, 1986: 419-420). To 
claim one economic indicator ‘leads’ another seems also too causally deterministic 
when taken into a Marxian dialectical approach. There is some empirical justification 
to this interrelation, with Kothari et al. (2017: 16) finding investment growth was 
predictable from past profits but also that a decline in profit was predictable from past 
levels of high investment. 
 
 
While further elaboration is always desirable, the scope of this thesis prevents it from 
making any definitive assessment on the debate on whether investment will follow 
from profit, vice versa, or that both follow the other. Rather, having recognized the 
empirical studies above, it is enough to claim that profit, investment and growth have 
a strong and interconnected relation, and that this is often seen empirically as 
increasing rate of profit leading to increasing investment and finally increased growth. 
With the assumption that the rate of profit helps significantly determines the level of 
investment, which in turn significantly determines the level of growth, it can now be 
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recognized what the effects of persistent low profitability cause for economic growth; 
this being an unstable economy and secular stagnation (Freeman, 2015: 79; Kliman, 
2009: 17-19). When more capital is on average producing a lower rate of profit, this 
means any decline in the rate of profit has more significant economic effects than it 
would have at a higher rate of profit. 
 
 
Kliman (2009: 17) gives the example of an economy where a business needs an 
average rate of profit of 6 percent in order to survive. If there is a decline in the rate of 
profit, since more businesses are closer to the 6 percent rate then there would be in a 
medium-high rate profit economy, there are a far greater amount who go into 
bankruptcy. Naples (1997) has suggested consequences of bankruptcy include 
increasing the expenditure multiplier, the change in GDP induced by crisis, thereby 
driving the economic decline. As Keynes also first suggested, a greater amount of 
capital falling into bankruptcy increases lenders risk, meaning businesses will find 
obtaining credit more difficult due to higher lending standards, thereby potentially 
breaking many borrowing and lending chains (Naples, 1997: 512). 
 
 
This explains, therefore, that even if the average rate of profit had stopped falling and 
had even been growing for many years, even a temporary fall will have large 
destabilizing effects since the rate of profit is still low (Kliman, 2009: 18). As 
demonstrated above, the low rate profit economy also effects economic accumulation 
through suppressing investment demand, this in turn means poor growth in output, 
income and employment. It should also be recognized that slow growth in income 
(including government revenue, profits and wages) means capitalists, workers and the 
state will increase their borrowing and have difficulty paying this debt back (Kliman, 
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2009: 18; Harman, 2010: 281). Indeed the source of this borrowed income, financial 
capital, begins to play a greater role within capital production as the low rate profit 
economy begins to form. 
 
 
A low rate of profit, according to Marxian analysis, will instigate an expansion of 
financial capital usually through the placement of credit into new and riskier capital 
investment adventures in the hopes of securing ‘some kind of extra profit, which will 
be independent of the general average…’ (Marx, 2016: 503). The general 
reproduction process, therefore, proceeds to overproduction and is pushed to ‘its 
extreme limits’ because: 
 
 
A great part of the social capital is applied by those who are not its 
owners, and who therefore proceed quite unlike owners who, when 
they function themselves, anxiously weight the limits of their private 
capitals (Marx, 2016: 503). 
 
 
When the line of borrowing and lending eventually breaks, the hidden underlying 
problem of the low profit economy comes becomes transparent. Having taken this 
framework into consideration, we can now return to the concrete empirical world of 
‘actually existing capitalism’ as seen in the instance of the Great Depression (Harvey, 
2010: 53). 
 
 
The Rate of Profit and the Organic Composition of Capital 
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As shown, the average rate of profit for the period 1925-29 was 15.3%, higher than 
the previous five year average but still significantly low compared to other periods, 
nearly reaching the level of decline that was seen during the peak of long depression 
in the 1890s and the start of World War I. This suggests, that even though the rate of 
profit had started an upward phase in late 1928 early 1929, its long term decline had 
established destabilizing effects within the US economy. Thus, the US economy was 
more likely to move into economic crisis and recession with any type of serious 
fluctuations elsewhere in the economy, such as the US Federal Reserve raising 
interest rates in 1928 due to a rising concern about financial speculation, followed by 
stock market decline in October 1929 (Roberts, 2016: 45-46). 
 
 
With the productive sector unable to make a satisfactory surplus due to the high 
technical composition of capital, investment moved to the financial sector, going far 
beyond what the general rate of profit would have allowed in increased levels of 
accumulation within the productive sphere. This can be seen in nonfinancial profits 
increasing by 14% between 1923 and 1929, while financial capital saw profit gains 
rise 177% in the same period (Roberts, 2016: 54). Investment decisions began to 
increasingly separate from underlying economic structures, debentures and shares 
within productive investment remained largely constant in the 1920s, meanwhile new 
bonds and shares tripled for speculative investment (Roberts, 2016: 54; 97). This 
meant that along with the build up of constant capital in the productive sector, there 
was also now a mass of ‘fictitious capital’ that would also take time to eliminate, 
which contributed to the length of the Great Depression (Roberts, 2016: 97). 
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The amount of accumulated fixed capital can be seen in the growth in the ratio of the 
organic composition of capital (OCC), the price (not value) expression of constant 
capital divided by variable capital. Estimating its trajectory through the use of 
Duménil and Lévy’s data, it’s general trend had between upward from 1870, growing 
from about 1.6 percent to 2.3 percent in 1892, 2.5 percent in 1912 and 2.1 percent by 
1918 (Roberts, 2016: 43; 53). It then saw its first massive decrease since the 1870s 
and nearly reached as low as 1.6 percent by 1924. This decrease may be explained by 
the capital destruction brought about in the US through the First World War, the 
1920s Recessions and the subsequent high levels of bankruptcies in this period (see 
below). Despite this, subsequent accumulation in constant capital was so rapid in that 
the OCC would then go on to reach its previous high levels by the time the Great 
Depression was underway, reaching a peak rate of 2.1 percent by 1931. 
 
 
Table 4.3 provides the rate of profit and the organic composition ratios15 for the 
period 1929-1942. We see here that while the low rate of profit is slowly recovering 
in this period, it is not until 1942 that it is able to transcend the rate of profit that was 
achieved on the eve of the crash in 1929. It was only until the OCC reached a low 
enough level of 13 percent in 1933, that the rate of profit was finally able to begin its 
transition upwards, its trough of 6 percent moving to 8 percent. These figures 
indicate, therefore, that while the US and World economy may have been able to 
recover from this economic stagnation caused by the Great Depression, it would 
 
15 Table 4.3 rate of profit and organic composition of capital are calculated from data from 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The rate of profit= value added-depreciation/private net fixed 
assets, the organic composition of capital= private fixed assets/private wages. The OCC is 
calculated only for the private economy, making it differ from Duménil and Lévy’s OCC 
which encompasses government capital. 
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likely have taken a far longer period of time to reach previous levels of growth. With 
the Government overtaking investment spending in World War II, however, this was 
largely by-passed and what is more, the high degree of devalorisation during the war 
ensured that even when Government investment spending left the higher rates of 
profit awaiting private capital would ensure vast expansion. 
 
 
Table 4.3 The Rate of Profit and the Organic 
 
Composition of Capital, 1929-1942 
Year Rate of Profit Organic Composition of 
 
Capital 
1929 14% 19% 
1930 12% 18% 
1931 10% 17% 
1932 7% 14% 
1933 6% 13% 
1934 8% 14% 
1935 11% 16% 
1936 11% 16% 
1937 12% 18% 
1938 10% 16% 
1939 11% 17% 
1940 12% 17% 
1941 14% 19% 
1942 18% 23% 
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Source: Freeman (2009) Alan Freeman ‘Calculations on the Profit Rate and on Long-Run 
Trends in the US Economy’ table N9 and AL9 under ‘Raw Data (NIPA)’. Calculation taken 
from BEA (2018). 
 
 
Returning to the lower rate of profit, however, we can see it’s contribution to 
stagnating private investment in other ways, particularly through destabilizing credit 
lending and subsequently reducing the capital population, which would temporarily 
restrict the investment strength of the US economy. As Kliman’s (2010) has argued, 
with a general low rate of profit economy, any temporary decline in the ROP results 
in a greater number of capitalists moving into insolvency and discontinuing 
production. As Figure 4.1 in chapter 4 shows, bankruptcies were inordinately high in 
the decade preceding the Great Depression. This is in part explained by the early 
1920s crisis which culminated up to 23,676 by 1922. Yet even after the economic 
recovery was complete, their yearly rate was unprecedented: 20,615 bankruptcies in 
1924, 21,214 in 1925, 21,773 in 1926, 23,146 in 1927 and 23,842 in 1928. Along with 
the Federal Reserve’s internet rate rise, these persistent bankruptcies helps explain the 
contraction in credit lending, with finance capital experiencing lending losses, leading 
to a reassessment of their risk exposure which meant a restriction on their borrowing 
(Harman, 2010: 148). As Naples study indicates (1997: 512) with a greater amount of 
capital going into insolvency, this could not only explain the acceleration from 
recession into depression, but why the economy stagnated so long during the 1930s; 
the business population had experienced a high degree of losses, meaning there were 
fewer economic agents able to engage in investment expenditure. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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Concluding chapter 4, we can see that the late 19th and early 20th century seemingly 
demonstrates that capitalism relies on capital devalorisation in helping to ensure a 
recovery in the profit rate. Yet it also reveals two more things. Firstly, as the Great 
Depression in particular illuminated, it shows that while there is a cyclical trend of 
capitalist crisis and recovery through this process of devalorisation, there is a long- 
term trend of stagnation as the profit rate declines over time, though it is able to 
recover briefly in the short period. The second insight, which relates to the first, is 
that while the mechanism of devalorisation may work in helping to restore the 
economy, this does not mean that the social costs that occur through this destruction 
are either immediately or ever remedied. As will be discussed at greater length in 
chapter 5, the state relying on the capitalism to heal itself during the Great Depression 
lead to unprecedented suffering on the part of the American working class. The long 
term failure of the endogenous mechanism of recovery means that it must rely on an 
external mechanism if it is to avoid the political contradictions of working class 
destitution. Fortunately for capitalism, this was precisely what occurred with both the 
creation of ‘the new deal’ as well as the arrival of World War II. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The US State and Capital Destruction 
Post World War II 
 
 
Introduction: From World War II to post-1980 
 
 
This chapter continues the empirical investigation into the endogenous mechanism of 
capitalist recovery from economic crisis, that of capital destruction. It starts with the 
involvement of the US in the Second World War, precipitating an unprecedented 
degree of capital destruction both through the devalorisation of domestic capital as it 
was converted into public capital for the war and then reconverted into private capital 
with the latter’s ending. What is more, the physical capital destruction abroad within 
the defeated nation-states such as Germany and Japan allowed for capital 
accumulation opportunities for American capitalism, such as the expansion of its 
export markets. It was thus both the renewed ability for capital to valorise at higher 
rates of profit, along with opportunity in increasing the mass of profits that new 
market expansion would allow, that significantly contributed to world capitalism 
moving into an ‘long boom phase’ in the post war period. 
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At the time, however, many saw the continuing success and stability of the US 
economy to be heavily reliant on the US state’s involvement within the economy. 
This was especially true of many capitalists, who were also convinced of the need for 
government involvement within economy due to the ideological and geopolitical 
threats posed by rise of the rival hegemonic power, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 89-90). This threat was particularly 
blatant in the initial post war period with the rise of the radical working class 
movement both within America and abroad. It was these forces that drove the US 
state and many other Western nations to adopt monetary and fiscal policies that 
promoted economic stability as a priority (Maier, 1987: 161-162). 
 
 
This chapter will thus focus on the ways that the prevention of the devalorisation of 
capital in the name of economic stability produced a crisis of profitability which 
began to make itself apparent from the economic crises of the 1970s and the 
subsequent stagnation experienced by global capitalism. In response to the low rates 
of profit, the American capitalist class would consolidate and seek to transform the 
policy priorities of the state away from economic stability and towards profit 
maximization for the capitalist class. While American capitalists were largely 
successful in changing the nature of the state from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, 
seemingly helping a new cycle of capital devalorisation, this chapter ends with a 
discussion on whether the post-1980s can be seen as genuine economic recovery in 
light of issues with measuring the process of capital destruction from the end of the 
1970s. 
 86 
Whether there was an economic recovery also relates to the poor performance in 
profit rates and economic growth after the 1970s, significantly smaller compared to 
the twenty-five-year period following World War II. While the Great Depression saw 
the advanced capitalist nations ruling class turn to the state for transcending 
capitalism’s limitations, this was no longer considered necessary or desirable by 
capital during the economic crises experienced in the 1970s In part, this was due to 
their being no broad pressure from the working class as there had been during the 
Great Depression, as well as the belief by capitalists that the crisis being experienced 
was in part a result of state regulation of the economy (Maier, 1987: 222-223). Thus 
capitalists, especially American capitalists, would push for the deregulation of the 
economy to promote the expansion into new avenues of investment that allowed for a 
higher realization of profit, such as in the financial sphere (Orhangazi, 2011: 8). 
 
 
The Political Contradiction of Capital Devalorisation and the Emergence of the 
Post War Labour-Capital Accord 
 
 
As was initially discussed in Chapter 4, the policy of non-interference by the state at 
the beginning of the Great Depression unveiled a latent contradiction in the capitalist 
mode of production, a contradiction which expressed itself in particularly violent 
fashion for US capitalism. This was that the endogenous mechanism of recovery, the 
way capital destruction renewed the reproduction process, could only occur through 
mass scale bankruptcy. This meant that the simultaneous dissolution of one of the 
primary social contracts at the base of capitalism’s regime legitimacy, the wage- 
labour bargain between workers and capitalists (Bryer, 2012: 516; Perry and 
Villamizar-Duarte, 2016: 19-20). 
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Thus, despite US labour lacking a history of broad working-class activism associated 
with class consciousness16, the basis for the capitalist mode of production’s 
legitimation came into serious question by a growing sector of a radicalized working 
class (Bryer, 2013: 584; Hillard, 2010: 66). As capitalists went bankrupt, the 
unemployment rate moved from 3% in August 1929 to 25% by March 1933 (Roberts, 
2016: 46). The stark material reality led to a populist mood for greater intervention by 
the state into the economy (Brinkley, 1998: 20-21; Storrs, 2013: 16-17). 
 
 
Among other things, this resulted in the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt who, 
despite wishing to reform capitalism in the hopes of restoring legitimacy to the system 
itself, still garnered the support of and appealed to the newly radicalized segment 
within American society, as can be seen in the language he chose to adopt during his 
presidential campaign. This was a pledge for a ‘new deal for the American 
people…[that was]…more than a political campaign. It is a call to arms” (Storrs, 
2013: 16-17). Nonetheless, it was only after the massive intervention into the 
economy during World War II, along with the meeting of the Allies after the war at 
Bretton Woods, that the US state finally began to accept a major role in arbitrating not 
only the growth of the domestic and world economy, but also the responsibility of 
resolving economic crisis and slumps. This ‘crucial reform’ significantly changed the 
US economic system and its model of accumulation (Dymski, 2015: 157-158). 
 
 
 
16 Bryer’s (2012) work provides an excellent overview about the suppression of class 
consciousness in America through both violent repression along with what some writers have 
referred to as hegemonic apparatuses/ideological influences that universalized ‘capitalist 
interests’ into ‘common interests’. 
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This crucial reform was a new ‘social contract’ between the working class and 
capitalists, here referred to as the ‘capital-labour accord’ (Weisskopf, 1994: 161). 
While this contract has been issued many names and described with a variety of 
characteristics17, one of the most relevant aspects of concern here was the US states 
implicit guarantee of intervention with macroeconomic tools to alleviate fluctuations 
in the business cycle, a combined promise of stability and growth for capital as well 
as the expansion of income, opportunity and security for workers (Arrighi and Silver 
1999: 205). Workers would no longer be subject to the full volatility of unregulated 
socio-economic effects that cyclical crises brought through capital devalorisation, 
with the state seeking to control and even eliminate the negative effects of the 
business cycle (for example of this belief, see NBER, 1954: xxii-xxiii). While this 
role was both diverse and pervasive, of particular interest here is the fiscal and 
monetary policies that sought to maintain this accord. These policies would go on to 
establish a new contradiction in the capitalist recovery process, beginning in the late 
1960s. In particular, inflation would become so disrupt to accumulation, in particular 
inhibiting profiteering, that capitalists would seek to abandon the established labour- 
capital accord. 
 
 
World War II 
 
 
 
 
17 Weisskopf (1994: 161) describes this contract as forming the basis for three ‘institutional 
pillars’ within America’s post-war economic political system. The ‘capital-labour accord’, 
argues Weisskopf, should refer specifically to the assurance to capital of its control over the 
management of production and labour compliance in exchange for rising wages and job 
security. Others, however, have labelled the agreement as ‘consensus capitalism’, an 
agreement between unions and capitalists of ‘managements right to manage’ and ‘workers 
right to organise’ (Bryer 2016: 2). 
 89 
 
In chapter 3, the general cycle of capital destruction/devalorisation was outlined. This 
is where the surplus value inlayed in the commodities of fixed capital and consumer 
goods was either transferred to other capitalists once the original owners went 
insolvent, or was simply removed from the reproduction process all together, thereby 
decreasing the technical and organic composition of capital, allowing the rate of profit 
to recover. Bankruptcies were at record highs in the 1930s, as were the degree in 
which capitalists had been absorbing abandoned commodities and means of 
production with this inlayed value, as seen by mergers and acquisitions moving from 
a trough of around 250 mergers in 1924, and expanding to a peak in 1930 to 1250 
(Aglietta, 1979: 223, Diagram 11). Yet due to the stagnating effects of a low rate of 
profit, recovery was slow. This is where a second source of capital destruction comes 
into consideration; that not purely of the economic and cyclical process of capitalist 
reproduction, but through the help of an ‘exogenous’ force, that of the capitalist state. 
This state based capital destruction came in two forms, the first of which will now be 
considered. 
 
 
Capital Destruction Type One: Purchasing of Private Capital 
 
 
In the post-Depression period, especially in the lead up to World War II, the advanced 
capitalist nations saw an expansion of the state apparatus into private sphere 
Like the rest of the world capitalist economies, the German economy had been badly 
affected by the Great Depression and also like the US nation-state, this stark material 
reality induced significant social change, that being the spread and triumph of 
Nazism. Beginning in 1933, a Hitler led capitalist state now began massive military 
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mobilization for establishing a new Third Reich. Through Government based demand 
the economy quickly recovered (Temin, 1991: 580). A similar process was followed 
by the Japanese capitalist state (Harman, 2010: 155). With this neo-imperialism 
reaching a conjuncture as Britain and Germany declared war, the U.S. state now 
responded to the prospect of war as it had previously; by overtaking the production 
process itself as well as by directly managing private capital within the war economy, 
though on a much larger scale than during World War I (see IEP, 2011: 7-8). While 
there had been a large degree of devalorisation during the crisis years of 1929-1933, 
the rate of profit was not recovering quickly enough to induce capitalist to invest 
(Mattick, 1981: 134-135). This changed with the state’s intervention. 
 
 
From the beginning of the 1940s, the US government took over a large portion of the 
means of production and commodity capital and integrated it into the growing war 
economy. This meant a substantial amount of idle capital not engaged in production 
due to a stagnating economy was again able to move through the valorisation process. 
The transfer of civilian capital to military capital was able to occur on such a large- 
scale due to the ease of transference. As Hooks and Bloomquist (1992: 305) argue, 
much of the civilian factories and commodities seized were easily transferable 
because both were mutually consumable by civilians or the military, e.g. structures 
such as automobile factories were converted to make tanks and aircraft parts, while 
equipment such as anti-aircraft mounts replaced electric washing machines etc. 
Debate about government intervention in the economy and the expansion of working 
class rights were put aside and a ‘grand truce with capital’ which had previously been 
attempted and failed during the late 1930s, was reinforced (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 
62). While the private production process continued, most capitalists were directed 
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towards the purposes of winning the war. Still, as Panitch and Gindin (2012: 73) aptly 
summarise, while the state came to dominant the economy during the war, there was 
an understanding with capital that the government was only ‘custodians of an 
economy owned by the capitalist’. 
 
 
Government bodies estimate that in the course of the war, 65% of new investment in 
plant and equipment was either under the direction and/or paid for directly by the US 
state (Hooks and Bloomquist, 1992: 304). The change in private inventories, which 
measures the value of the changes in the physical volume of inventories (additions 
minus withdrawals) indicates the dramatic amount of devalorisation that occurred as 
the state overtook the production process (BEA, 2014: 7-1, 7-2). Change in inventory 
investment moved from a peak of 4.3% increase in 1941 and then declined to 1.9% by 
1942, -0.7% in 1943, -0.9% in 1944 and -1.5% in 1945 (BEA, NIPA Table 1.1.5 
Gross Domestic Product, current US Dollars, line 12). As one economic writer 
concludes regarding the state’s role in recovering the rate of profit, ‘the war economy 
did not stimulate the private sector, it replaced the free market and capital investment 
for profit’, if only temporarily (Roberts, 2016: 57, italics in original). When the war 
did end and the state reverted the economy’s control back to private enterprise, 
capitalists were able to obtain ‘fire-sale prices’ on production plants and war 
equipment, expanding their rate of profit even further (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 81). 
 
 
Capital Destruction Type Two: The Physical Destruction of Capital Abroad and 
the Prospects for Economic Recovery 
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The second form of capital destruction that took place and allowed both the US and 
the world capitalist economy to undertake a period of renewed capital accumulation, 
was the physical destruction of capital that occurred through the process of warfare 
itself. A good example of this can be seen in the unprecedented mass use of aerial 
bombings, in particular of civilian populated areas where industrial centers were 
concentrated. While this new type of warfare was conducted by nearly all the 
capitalist nations involved, as the Ally forces began to turn the tide of war, it was the 
Axis powers (Germany, Italy and Japan) who received the majority of attacks 
wrought by the UK’s Royal Air Forces and (RAF) the United States Army Air Forces 
(AAF)18. While the AAF had a policy focused on destroying industrial targets to stop 
the means by which the Axis Powers could conduct their warfare, both it and the RAF 
widened bombing to entire cities and civilian populated areas for the purposes of 
breaking morale (Crane, 2016: 1-4)19. A conservative estimate puts total destruction 
of Germany’s industrial plants at 20 percent (Judt, 2005: 82). Harrison (2000: 42), on 
the other hand, estimates 17.4 per cent of fixed capital assets were destroyed by aerial 
bombing alone. In millions of Deutsche Mark (1962 prices), one author tables gross 
German capital from its peak to trough from 1944 to 1948, finding machinery and 
equipment decreasing from 64,852 to 54,899 marks while structures decreased from 
40,061 to 33,100 marks (Vonyó, 2008: 34-35). Within Japanese territory both 
 
 
 
18 This capital destruction was expanded when, as the Allies invaded Germany territory and 
Nazi forces retreated, Hitler implemented a ‘scorched earth policy’. This involved ordering 
commanding officers to destroy any infrastructure being left behind during the retreat so as to 
deprive the Allies of acquiring any abandoned resource. 
19 There is academic contention regarding whether the official AAF policy of avoiding 
civilian targeting was largely ignored in practice, a subject which this thesis does not have 
room to discuss (see Crane, 2016: 4-5). 
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industrial and civilian-intensive areas were subjected to indiscriminate firebombing, 
resulting in the destruction of 67 cities. This culminated in the use of nuclear weapons 
on the cities of major industrial importance to the Japanese war economy, that of 
Nagasaki and Hiroshima (Crane, 2016: 5). Harrison’s (2000: 42) estimates a total of 
34 percent of all industrial fixed asset produced in Japan during the war as being 
destroyed by 1945. Some industrial centers were completely destroyed, with one 
contemporary economist of the period estimating that in areas such as Berlin and 
Rome, as much as 9 out of 10 capital structures were either entirely destroyed or 
made completely unusable (Grampp, 1946: 343). 
 
 
Therefore, while the devalorisation of capital that took place can largely be attributed 
to a type of ‘exogenous’ event20 rather than the usual endogenous recovery 
mechanism of capitalism, it was nonetheless fully taken advantage of by US 
capitalists and the American state once it was seen as inevitable (Panitch and Gindin, 
2012: 71-72). As early as the 1939, statesmen and administrators within the US 
government had already perceived the economic potential for an America going to 
war, as well the possibilities within a post-war ravaged world economy. Alfred 
Hansen, an influential public economist who would later help create the American 
social security system, claimed that ‘Wars not only promote employment during the 
emergency, but may stimulate post-war private investment by creating accumulated 
shortages in housing and other investment areas’ (Mattick, 1984: 126). Bureaucrat 
 
20 Though the ‘exogenous’ war itself was arguably in part caused by the onset of Great 
Depression and the poor economic performance of capitalism thereafter, leading Germany 
and Japan to seek solutions to stagnation by moving to a unique form of nationalist based 
capitalism, a regime that required expansion into neighboring nation-states to maintain the 
levels of accumulation being achieved (Harman, 2010: 154). 
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and later Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, made clear during a speech at Yale 
University that while nation-states across the world were experiencing massive 
economic upheaval and disruption, this nonetheless made way for an American 
transnational economic policy that could come to play a ‘therapeutic’ role for the 
world economy (quoted in Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 69). 
 
 
This could be done by, among other things, “making capital available in those parts of 
Europe which need productive equipment” that had and would be destroyed with the 
conclusion of the war (ibid). Economist and influential policy maker within the US 
Treasury, Harry White, made a series of suggestions after US entry into the war for 
‘internationalizing the new deal’, among them ‘providing the huge amounts of capital 
that the European economies would need for reconstruction’ (Panitch and Gindin, 
2012: 74). Even those within the US state’s bureaucratic apparatus that did oppose 
American intervention in the war initially did so only due to a fear that its length and 
scale would embolden revolutionary working class movements and strengthen 
international opposition to US capitalism (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 72). 
 
 
It seems clear then that when the US state began to intervene in the reconstruction of 
largely desolate economies through instituting the European Recovery Program (ERP) 
(aka the Marshall Plan), its intention was not only to rebuild the wore-torn economies 
of Western Europe in and of themselves, but to do so for the benefit of its own 
domestic capitalists. In essence, it was intended to expand the US capitalist market, to 
make it so Europe, as US diplomat Allen Dulles succinctly put it, bought ‘substantial 
amounts of our product’ (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 89). It was assumed early on by 
policy makers that US private capital expansion into Europe after the war was 
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imminent. While this did not occur on the scale initially assumed, this was only due to 
the fact that with the state taking over such as a large part of the US economy for the 
war, reconversion into a civilian economy was a momentous task that allowed for no 
substantial amount of capital to be spared in oversea capital markets (Panitch and 
Gindin, 2012: 90). Regardless, The Marshall plan is estimated to have contributed a 
quarter of new capital formation to the German economy and 15 percent of new 
capital in France and the UK and Italy (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 96). 
 
It is interesting to note that an author adopting the neoclassical growth model found 
similar conclusions, arguing that it was the large degree of physical destruction of 
capital stock that spurred US investment, bringing about rapid growth in the post-War 
II world era. Cook (2002: 131; 137), applying the model within the context of ‘many 
countries (Japan and in Europe) suffere[ing] severe damage to their capital plant’ 
explains in his conclusion, ‘during the postwar era, continental Europe and Japan 
grew faster than the English-speaking[?] Allies that were less damaged by the war. 
This high growth slowed over time, consistent with diminishing returns to investment 
as capital deepened’. Another empirical study by Auray et al. (2014: 226) reveals 
similar results, finding that when examining key macroeconomic aggregates of nine 
countries during WWII, those countries who had experienced a large portion of the 
war on their home soil had within 5 years after the conflict’s conclusion either 
returned to or had exceeded their previous level of output. It seems clear, therefore, 
that the boom that America’s allies and the world economy in general would 
experience up until the 1970s can in part be explained to the unprecedented physical 
destruction of capital and the opportunities this created for capital accumulation. Yet 
this recovery also needs to be understood within the context of America’s supremacy 
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in the world economy and the effects domestic capital devalorisation had on its rate of 
profit. 
 
 
Recovery in the Rate of Profit and US Domestic Recovery 
 
 
Just like after World War I, the late arrival of the US into the war meant it had not 
exhausted its resources like its ally capitalist nation states, such as the UK, nor did it 
need to begin industrial production from scratch as the German and Japanese 
economies needed too. Gross domestic production began to see a momentous shift in 
1940, with the economy expanding to twice the level of 1929 by the year 1944 
(Roberts, 2016: 56). It is of note that there has been a degree of disagreement among 
traditional economists over the state’s role in helping the economy move out of the 
depression, with some claiming the role has been overstated (Delong and 
Summers,1988; Romer, 1992). Delong and Summers (1988: 467), for example, claim 
that five-sixths of output lost during the Depression had already been made up before 
US entry into the war. 
 
 
Yet upon examining Delong and Summer's data, Vernon (1994: 851) finds that half of 
this recovered output in fact occurred during the years 1941-1942, when the US 
economy was well on the way in its transition to war time production, though it had 
not yet declared war. Furthermore, it should be also noted that while America’s output 
is an important economic indicator of the economic growth it has experienced, most 
economists would agree that it must also be seen in connection with other economic 
variables, such as GDP and unemployment (Dow, 2000: 116-117) When these are 
also taken into account, indicators show that by 1940 the American economy still had 
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more than halfway to go to match pre-depression levels (Vernon, 1994: 853). Indeed, 
GDP expanded to twice the level of 1929 by the year 1944 (Roberts, 2016: 56). 
Furthermore, this thesis has also suggested (see chapter 4) that one of the most 
significant indicators for understanding the recovery and growth within an economy is 
investment and the rate of profit. When examining the relation in the rate of 
investment and the amount of capital stock (the organic composition of capital), the 
source of economic recovery is clear. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Gross State and Private Spending 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Freeman, (2009) 
 
 
 
It can be seen in Figure 5.1 that, as with the average rate of profit, the rise in private 
investment began only after the organic composition of capital was sufficiently 
reduced by 1933 to 13%. Like the ROP and OCC, private investment did begin to 
Organic Composition of Capital Gross private investment (% of GDP) State spending (% of GDP) 
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
 98 
recover after 1933, but at a much slower rate than previous cycles. With the 
probability of war increasing, by 1940 the US state had expanded spending to 21 
percent and by the end of 1941 (after Pearl Harbor) had initiated a total war economy 
that saw investment jump to 39% in 1942, peaking at 48% by 1943. Meanwhile, the 
ROP had recovered dramatically. As can be seen below in Table 5.1, it increased 
4.4% between 1940 to 1941, followed by 8% the following year and 6.3 % the year 
after that. In comparison, the rate of profit only recovered by 5 percent between 1929 
and 1939. While it is possible that the US economy could have recovered to former 
output without intervention, it is likely this would have been at a much later date than 
the start of the 1940s, similar to the way the capitalist economies of the world did not 
return to previous growth rates until the late 1890s following the financial panic 
experienced in the 1870s (Roberts, 2016: 31). However, regardless of the cause of 
recovery, it can nonetheless be stated that the state became increasingly integrated 
into the capitalist accumulation regime after the 1930s. This resulted in a rising 
contradiction in the acquisition of profit, with capitalism’s mechanism for ensuring 
increased rates of return through the devalorisation process being halted. How and 
why the US State did this is explored in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 The Rate of Profit 
of Domestic US Corporations 
Measured in Historical Cost, 
1929-1950 
Year Rate of Profit 
1929 20.8% 
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1931 15.8% 
1932 9.5% 
1933 5.4% 
1934 5.8% 
1935 10.6% 
1936 13.0% 
1937 16.1% 
1938 17.8% 
1939 14.5% 
1940 16.7% 
1941 21.1% 
1942 29.1% 
1943 35.4% 
1944 40.8% 
1945 41.4% 
1946 36.1% 
1947 33.1% 
1948 39.9% 
1949 44.5% 
1950 39.3% 
Source: Profit Rate for US Corporation Data taken from Andrew Kliman ‘Data and Graphs 
Accompanying the Persistent Fall in Profitability Underlying the Current Crisis’ Available at: 
http://akliman.squarespace.com/persistent-fall (Property Income of Domestic 
Corporations/Net Stock of Private Fixed Assets of Domestic Corporations). 
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The State’s Role in the Prevention of Capital Devalorisation 
 
 
As was discussed in chapter 4, when the US government tentatively expanded its role 
into the reproduction of capitalism during the 1930s, many capitalists were divided 
about the changing nature of capital and state relations, with some supportive of the 
government providing general coordination and market stability while others rejected 
all forms of market intervention (Vietor, 2000: 977; 986).21 This attitude shifted 
dramatically in the immediate post-war period. When the stagnating economy 
recovered and victory came for the Allies, seemingly by the US state overtaking 
and/or coordinating a large portion of production, a newly formed ruling class 
consensus was that the state’s role was vital to the functioning of the private economy 
(Mattick, 1981: 129; Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 62). Yet while the US state’s role had 
undoubtedly changed after World War II, direct management of the economy was not 
common policy. Rather, the American state helped capitalists circuitously, using a 
range of policies that functioned to provide the accumulation process with a sense of 
stability and certainty in the realisation of profit Harman, 2010: 168-169; Maier, 
1987: 161). Why capitalists and policymakers desired the state to provide this 
guarantee of stability in the post war period when 27 years prior (i.e. after World War 
I) they argued for the government to ‘cease their attempts at regulation and restriction, 
stop meddling with business, and return to the balmy days of laissez faire’, can be 
explained by the changing material conditions of the United States’ and world’s 
political economy (quote from Ayres, 1933: 210). 
 
 
 
 
21 For an overview of capitalism reaction to the New Deal and how its legislative actions were 
perceived by a diverse section of American capitalists, see (Vietor, 2000: 969-986) 
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With the war over, there was now an immediate fear government retreat from the 
reproduction process after the ending of World War II would lead to recession, even a 
return to the stagnate economy of the Great Depression years (Harman, 2010: 161; 
Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 81). A larger (though connected) concern had also emerged 
amongst the American capitalists and policymakers who would come to make up the 
post-war ruling class, a persistent fear of another wave of working class radicalization 
reoccurring if the US and its allied economies were left to recover through the free 
market’s own internal recovery mechanism, as had occurred during the Great 
Depression (Kliman, 2010: 24; Mattick, 1981:139). This was deemed, as one Marxist 
writer reflects, as ‘socially too risky’ (Mattick, 1981: 139). Concern was given in 
particular to the devastated economies of now allied Japan and European economies 
such as Western Germany, where leftist political forces were popular in the 
immediate aftermath of the war (Hobsbawm, 1995: 258-259). This fear was 
exacerbated further through the initial success of many European economies under the 
Soviet Union’s direct rule or influence and the USSR itself grew faster than any 
Western country. 
 
 
This left many policymakers to believe that the future advantage lay with the Soviet 
Union, since direct control of its economy and lack of political accountability to its 
population meant it could direct far greater resources towards influencing and/or 
subverting the international world order than a Western nation might (Hobsbawm, 
1995: 259). The unease over the potential threat the communist bloc posed to the post 
war international capitalist order grew within two particular and interrelated areas. 
The first, which would come to be referred to as the ‘domino effect’, was the 
 
conversion of previously Western/capitalist friendly nation-states into communist 
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based regimes (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 19). With many of these nations providers 
of raw materials for developed nations such as the US, communist influence would 
mean western capitalists would no longer be able access essential resources or engage 
in the future expansion of investment (Painter, 2009: 164). Secondly, for the US and 
other capitalist nations, a communist hegemonic rival provided their domestic radical 
working-class forces not only a rival superpower as an ally, but threatened to instill 
these forces with institutional legitimacy by showing that pervasive public services 
and wealth redistribution policies were not necessarily prohibitive to strong growth or 
regime success (Foner, 1984: 59 Hillard, 2016: 4). 
 
 
The Role of the State in US Capitalism After World War II: The International 
Monetary Regime and the Permanent Arms Economy 
 
 
To ensure that Soviet communism did not outmatch the capitalist system, as well as to 
ensure the confidence of capitalists in a period of instability, the government of the 
US thus became more actively involved not only in the management of its own 
domestic economy, but that of the entire international economic system (Maier, 1987: 
161). The Bretton Woods conference of 1944 established an international monetary 
order between the US and its allies, renewing the era of global free trade as well as 
helping to prevent competitive devaluation by providing the US dollar, backed by 
gold, as the international currency of exchange (Eichengreen, 2013: 277). Until the 
monetary system’ collapse in 1971, it provided an effective price stabilization regime, 
with nation’s pegging their countries currency at a negotiated exchange parity with 
the US dollar. This fixed exchange rate was controlled within a 1 percent fluctuation 
by governments selling and purchasing foreign currencies (Cohn, 2008: 132). As a 
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considerable portion of post war accumulation within Japanese and Western European 
production relied on imported raw materials, in particular oil, the removal of tariffs as 
well as the markets reliance on price dependability, played a large part in stimulating 
the confidence of capitalists in immediate and future growth prospects (Lairson and 
Skidmore, 2003: 72). 
 
 
Yet while America’s allies desired the fixed exchange rate system for the security it 
provided to international transactions, US capitalists benefited not only from the price 
stability of the regime but the opportunities for accumulation and profiteering 
(Lairson and Skidmore, 2003: 74). When the US dollar was instituted as the 
international reserve currency, up to 90 percent of goods and services available in the 
international market became purchasable through US dollars (Vasapollo, 2012: 145). 
In addition, the productive capacity of the US far outstripped that of its allies, 
especially those who had experienced extensive capital destruction such as Germany 
and Japan. Between 1946 and 1949 the US accumulated $6 billion extra reserves, 
resulting in an international shortage of US dollars (Eichengreen, 2000: 493). While 
capitalists desired to continue to benefit from the advantages of the new international 
monetary regime, the ruling class recognised the mounting contradiction and that 
without increased and ongoing intervention by the state, it was expected that Western 
European economies would quickly attain multiple balance of payment crises. 
Policymakers, particularly in light of Soviet international influence, recognised that 
the success of the post war liberal international regime could not be left to natural 
market forces, but required American state intervention (Brett, 1983: 161). 
 
 
Intervention came largely through the provision of loans, along with military and aid 
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spending by the US government. Loans included the $3.75 billion provided to the 
United Kingdom at a 2% interest rate, while fiscal spending encompassed programs 
like the European Recovery Act of 1948 (aka the Marshall Plan) which between 1948 
and 1951 transferred $13 Billion US dollars to Western Europe (Panitch and Gindin, 
2012: 96; Lairson and Skidmore, 2003: 78). Success was quick and Western 
European per annum exports expanded to over 8 percent throughout the 1950s and 
1960s (Eichengreen, 1996: 54). Still, America would go on to persistently export 
more than it imported in goods and services, as well as invest more foreign capital 
than it received up until the 1970s. (Robinson, 1973: 400-401). Yet the US only 
briefly experienced a trade surplus in the immediate post war years and from the 
1950s retained a balance of payment deficit. The explanation for this can be seen in 
the large outflows of dollars through private and government remittances, state 
military spending, grants in aid and long-term investments in capital by US capitalists 
and the American government (Robinson, 1973: 401). These outflows of dollars were 
not only important in promoting Japanese and European growth, but in providing 
funds that could be used to finance allies welfare initiatives, in turn allowing for 
domestic labor-capital conciliation that shifted support away from communist 
influence and moved these nations towards supporting a new liberal world order, 
headed by the US (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 91; Lairson and Skidmore, 2003: 78). 
 
 
Just as importantly though, the outpouring of American dollars into Western Europe 
and Japan also formed an integral part of the post-war accumulation regime for the 
US economy. Subscribers to the Bretton woods plan who agreed to receive aid, as 
outlined under the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (aka the Marshall Plan), were 
subject to a range of stipulations that benefited American production and 
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consumption. Among other things, the provision of gratis commodities to US allies to 
meet supply shortfalls were bought by the government and produced by US business 
(Surrey, 1948: 515-516). American export capitalists also received guaranteed finance 
through the tying of aid spending to compulsory purchase of US produced goods and 
services, which was also transported through US shipping companies (Robinson, 
1973: 402). The US oil cartel, encompassing five American companies, saw 56 
percent of oil they imported into Europe paid for through the Marshall Plan 
administrative body, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), a raw 
material that would grow to encompass well over 50 percent Western Europe’s and 
Japan’s total energy needs by 1970 (Lairson and Skidmore, 2003: 72; Painter, 2009: 
164). 
 
 
American Military Spending and the Post War Economy 
 
 
A principal element of the economic success and stability of the post war US 
accumulation regime been attributed to the ‘military industrial complex’ or the 
‘permanent arms economy’, wherein US capitalists and military production funded by 
the American state were tied together and formed a large portion of production within 
the economy (Edelstein, 2000: 333; Harman, 2010: 168-169). While some academics 
have argued that the significance and the role of military spending in the American 
post war economy has been overstated22, most political economists accept that 
military production was an important feature of America’s post war economy 
(Edelstein, 2000: 333-334; Sen, 1986: 179). When World War II ended, US military 
 
 
22 For a critical view of the ‘military-industrial complex’ thesis in a variety of its forms, see 
Sen (1986). 
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spending decreased not to its previous pre-war average of 1 percent of GDP per 
annum, but to 4 percent, which was reached in 1948. After this, spending on arms 
again increased dramatically from 1951 to 1954, peaking as high as 13.3% of GDP 
expenditure and averaging 11.8%. While expenditure would not reach these heights 
again in the 20th century, overall the US continued to invest heavily in the armament 
production as Table 5.2 below shows. This spending had real effects on private 
production, with one report by the United Nations (UN) in the 1960s finding that total 
military spending contributed to half of the gross capital formation in the world 
economy (DESAUN, 1962: 47). Within the US, authors such as Michael Kidron 
estimated that 60 percent of the economies gross capital formation went into military 
production, although his estimates have been contested (See Pozo (2010); Harman, 
2010: 167). 
Table 5.2 U.S. Military 
 
Expenditure (% of GDP) 
Year Percentage of 
 
Expenditure 
1949 5.1% 
1950 4.9% 
1951 9.7% 
1952 13.3% 
1953 13.0% 
1954 11.2% 
1955 9.7% 
1956 9.5% 
1957 9.6% 
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1958 9.7% 
1959 9.0% 
1960 8.6% 
1961 8.8% 
1962 8.9% 
1963 8.5% 
1964 7.7% 
1965 7.2% 
1966 8.1% 
1967 9.1% 
1968 8.9% 
1969 8.3% 
1970 7.7% 
Source: SIPRI, 2018 
 
 
 
From the 1940s up until the late 1970s, the US state thus provided a structured 
economic mode of accumulation that meant capitalists could (among other things) not 
only acquire new opportunities to realise surplus value in international markets but 
also an expectation for long term profitability through state military spending in 
America’s industrial sector as the cold war continued. This assurance allowed 
capitalists to plan production and investment years in advance, creating what the 
economist Galbraith labelled the ‘planning system’, (quoted in Harman, 2010: 168). 
When the cold war became hot and the US moved to ‘contain’ Soviet influence 
abroad with direct military intervention such as in the Korean and Vietnam War, the 
level of demand for military goods and services meant that capital accumulation that 
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would have taken up to a decade now occurred with a few years (Edelstein, 2000: 
333). By providing this demand to a large section of America’s industrial base, the 
state sheltered them from the ‘immediate vagaries of the market’ (quote by Harman, 
2010: 169). Moreover, other sectors within the economy benefited from the 
‘multiplier effect’ this direct spending brought, thus lessening the impact of the 
business cycle of American capitalists in general (Vasapollo, 2012: 176). While the 
effects of a stable economy are numerous, of particular interest to this thesis is the 
impact on rate of business failure and the effects this brought to the capital 
devalorisation process and average rate of profit. 
 
 
US Bankruptcy Trends in the Post-War Period and the Contradiction of 
Eliminating Capital Devalorisation 
 
Regardless of whether the US state intervention in the economy in the post war period 
were responsible for Western capitalism’s economic golden age of growth, it’s 
integration into the capitalist accumulation regime nonetheless seems to have a strong 
correlation with the decline in business failures. As has been seen in Chapter 4, 
between 1895 and 1920 the peak/trough cycle of business failures and business cycles 
were largely in countercyclical synch, meaning that when the business cycles were in 
a contractive phase the economy would see a rise in bankruptcies and that during an 
economic phase of expansion, bankruptcies would fall. This inverse relation stopped 
after World War I, though as demonstrated earlier, increased bankruptcies broadly 
followed recessions. With external ‘variables’ such as the Great Depression and 
World War II over by 1945, it might be expected that the counter cyclical relation 
between business failures and the business cycle would resume. Yet as can be seen, 
bankruptcies after 1949 stopped any kind of cyclical pattern and largely stabilized, 
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moving in a slow secular trend upwards until 1961, followed by a slow secular 
decline until 1978. Even after the economic crisis of 1973, while bankruptcies 
increased in 1974, it was only by a small margin and was soon followed by a decline. 
The effectiveness of the state reigning in capital destruction can be seen in this 
comparative fact within the data series: more business failures occurred in America’s 
‘roaring twenties’ than the amount that occurred during the oil crisis of 1973. This is 
despite the US business population increasing from 111.9 million in 1922 to 211.9 
million. 
 
The stability in capitalist production was not only limited to the US, with similar 
trends of inhibited capital devalorisation being seen in the insolvency statistics for 
Germany and England. In Germany, the first few years of the 1950s saw the number 
of insolvencies circle below five-thousand a year, followed by a subsequent slow 
secular decline up until 1966 when a secular trend began upwards. Cyclical trough 
and peaks did not begin until after 1977. English insolvencies followed a ten-year 
secular trend upwards from 1960, though distinct from both US and German data this 
did contain some brief and small cyclical peak and troughs period. By 1970 a secular 
trend downwards begun until 1973 when insolvencies skyrocketed. Like America, the 
policies favorable to capitalists initiated by the states of both England and Germany in 
their post war accumulation models prevented the levels of capital destruction seen in 
past business cycles. Among other policies, this included higher levels of fiscal 
spending, German state spending as a percentage of GDP increased from 29.4% in 
1930, to 30.8% in 1950 and 37.6% in 1970. For the same years, UK state spending as 
a percentage of GDP moved from 24.7% to 30.4% to 39.3% (Dunn, 2009: 136, table 
7.2). 
 
Figure 5.2 Number of Business Insolvency in West Germany 1960-2000 
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Source: Federal Statistics Office (Destatis) (2016) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Number of Business Insolvency in England 1960-2000 
 
 
Source: The Insolvency Service (IS) (2015) 
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international competition from Germany and Japan (who were now acquiring dollars 
not through aid but the exporting of goods), increased levels of dollars held abroad 
and the growing uncertainty that the US dollar could be exchanged for gold (Brenner, 
2006: 99; Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 111-112). Yet of particular interest to this thesis 
is the contradiction that arose from the state attempting to eliminate cyclical capital 
destruction through stabilization policies, a reaction to both the rise of the Soviet 
Union as well as the memory of one of the greatest economic crises in history, the 
Great Depression. Yet, as is seen by the lack of capitalist bankruptcies, by removing 
capitalism’s natural recovery mechanism to restore the rate of profit, the state created 
a more fundamental contradiction within the capitalist accumulation process. While it 
is likely the physical destruction of capital that the Korean and Vietnam war would 
have contributed to offsetting some of the pressure of a rising fixed capital effect on 
extracting surplus value, the sector was still a relatively small part of the US economy 
and was unable to stop the long-term rise in the organic composition of capital. 
 
 
Accumulation problems began as early as the 1960s, and as capital found it 
increasingly difficult to realize profit, costs of production were shifted onto American 
consumers, who in turn demanded higher wages, meaning large increases in inflation 
(Foley, 2012: 254). The fact that this inflation was occurring to the reserve currency 
of the world economy was of particular concern to policy makers, with the dollars 
instability posing a ‘major threat to the world system of finance and commerce and 
even to our political leadership’ (Volcker, 1979: 6). 
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While recessions began as early 1968, and the fixed exchange rate system was ended 
in 1971 when the US suspended the convertibility of gold to its dollar, 1973 was at 
the time the worst recession experienced by the US and most of the capitalist world 
since 1937 (Zarnowitz and Moore, 1977: 471). With some brief respites, inflation and 
employment both rose significantly up until the early 1980s, something previously 
seen as impossible within the Phillips Curve model which saw a trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation levels (Kling, 2013: 267). As had occurred after the 
Great Depression, the dramatic change in economic conditions fostered a change in 
the ideological consensus of state elites. Fiscal spending decreased as early as 1968, 
with the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act, which reduced spending for both the 
military and domestic social programs (Brownlee, 2000: 1054-1055). A range of 
economic schools that promoted the notion that turning to government in cases of 
market failure was a ‘cure worse than the disease’ began to gain prominence 
(Friedman and Schwartz, 1987: 291). Economic crises were again being seen as 
necessary phenomenon, as ‘fluctuations’ that were optimal responses to the natural 
development of the market. As Prescott (1986: 18) succinctly states: ‘The policy 
implication…is that costly efforts at stabilization are likely to be counterproductive’ 
 
 
Though the Reagan administration is often accused of preaching fiscal restraint but 
expanding the deficit through military spending, the trend of spending was still 
downwards (see Miller, 1987: 238). From 1950 up to 1970, military expenditure 
ranged from 40 percent to 50 percent of total expenditure. By 1980 this dropped a 
significant degree to 24 percent. And while general public spending relative to GDP 
continued to rise between 1980 and 1983, by 1989 government spending at all levels 
(local, state) declined for the first time since the beginning of the post war period (for 
 113 
figures, see table 17.1 in Brownlee, 2000: 1014). More importantly though, the US 
state, pressured by a class alliance between industry and the rising sector of finance23, 
gave into the notion that a deflationary period for the US and world economy was 
becoming an essential factor in restoring not only confidence in the US dollar, both 
more importantly growth and profitability for capitalism generally (Harman, 2010: 
296-297). Policy officials, adopting the predominant Keynesian view of the post war 
period, saw an inherent connection between deflation and a contraction of the 
economy, as can be seen in Samuelson’s textbook definition of deflation: ‘Sustained 
deflation, in which prices fall steadily over a period of several years, are associated 
with depressions, such as occurred in the 1930s or the 1890s’ (quoted in Kaza, 2006: 
95). 
 
 
Yet with an ongoing decline in returns for capitalists and the rising influence of the 
new economic schools on policy, this view gradually changed, and the elimination of 
inflation quickly became seen as the one of the new primary economic concerns of 
the American government, in particular the Federal Reserve. As Paul Volcker (1979: 
2) made clear when taking over as chairman of the reserve in 1979: 
 
 
[public] surveys do not capture the insidious and debilitating effects of inflation…on our 
economic performance and growth prospects. It is not entirely a coincidence that we can 
observe in these recent inflationary years a declining tendency in the profitability of 
investment. …One estimate indicates that the annual after-tax return on corporate net 
 
 
 
23 As an industry, finance began to significantly expand after the collapse of the US fixed 
exchange regime since, among other things, it was now up to free market to hedge risk on 
floating currency exchanges. (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 169). 
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worth…has averaged 3.8 percent during the 1970s, a period characterized by rapid inflation, 
as compared to 6.6 percent in the 1960s. 
 
 
With this new policy objective, Volcker pushed interest rate to ‘painfully high’ levels 
and what became known as the ‘Volcker Shock’ lead the US economy and many 
other developed capitalists economies into a double dip recession (Panitch and 
Gindin, 2012: 163). While the crises was one of the most dramatic declines in the US 
economy since the Great Depression, with unemployment reaching double digits, the 
decline itself was brief relative to other recessions and was followed by renewed 
growth (Tapia Granados, 2014: 11) 
 
 
While it is not relevant to this thesis how inflation was actually halted24, it nonetheless 
correlates with these new money targeting policies, with the consumer price index 
moving from a growth rate of 13 percent in 1980 to 10 percent in 1981, 6 percent in 
1981 and finally 3 percent in 1983 (FRED, 2018). Meanwhile the producer price 
index retreated from a growth rate of 14 percent in 1980 to -2.8 percent by 1986. 
More importantly, however, was the massive expansion in business failures that the 
double dip recessions, with this increase in interest rates leaving many indebted 
capitalists unable to make repayments while also benefiting financial capitalists 
receiving higher rates of return on investment (Economakis et al., 2010: 485-486) 
 
 
 
 
24 i.e. Whether through the Federal Reserve’s new policy intiatives of directly limiting the 
money supply were effective in and of themselves or whether these policies simply indicated 
to capital the willingness of the state to engage in monetary policy to ‘break inflationary 
expectations’ (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 168). 
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Figure 5.4 Bankruptcies in England, West Germany and USA 1950-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: See sources for Figures 4.1, Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 
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up until 1997 while America and England’s declined, likely a result of the dramatic 
increase in the business population from German reunification in 1990, as well as the 
expansion of the private sector and decline of government industry in former East 
Germany (Roberts, 2016: 204-205). Before this, however, bankruptcy expansion 
began in the US in 1978 followed by England and Germany a year later in 1979. 
From that 1979 to the peak year of 1985, business bankruptcies expanded from 4537 
to 14,898 in England and 5483 to 13,625 in Germany. In the US, bankruptcies peaked 
in 1986 to 61,616, having increased from its trough of 6619 bankruptcies. 
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Thus, if the theory of recovery hitherto subscribed too in this thesis is accepted, the 
capital devalorisation indicated by these bankruptcy statistics would have been 
sufficient capital enough in the 1980s for a return to a new phase of expanded 
accumulation from a higher rate of profit in the advanced capitalist economies. While 
not directly prescribing to the premise of capital devalorisation as the source of 
recovery, a large proportion of Marxist theorists nonetheless agree that the global 
economy recovered after 1980 due to a restoration in the average rate of profit (for a 
list of these proponents see Choum et al., 2016: 1149). For example, prominent 
academics Duménil and Lévy (2011: 5) claim that the rate of profit recovered after 
the 1970’s crisis following a conversion by capital and state to a new form of 
accumulation that extracted surplus value through (among other things) the increased 
exploitation of labour through intensifying labour and reducing its wage, as well as 
expansion into new markets (see Chapter 3 which discusses how countertendencies 
work to restore a declining/low ROP). Yet Duménil and Lévy (2004: 28) also note a 
‘paradoxical observation’ in the recovery of the rate of profit. 
 
 
This paradox is the ongoing poor performance of a range of economic variables, 
especially the rate of accumulation (i.e. the advancement/investment of capital). 
Historically, the rate of accumulation and the rate of profit closely follow one another, 
meaning any recovery in profit should lead to a subsequent recovery in investment, 
which will increase employment, leading to an expansion of demand etc (Howard, 
2003: 622). But despite the recovery in the rate of profit in the 1980, investment 
remained low and unemployment remained high. Post-Keynesians have noted a 
similar trend, with one labelling it the ‘investment–profit puzzle’ (Treeck, 2008: 371). 
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Duménil and Lévy (2004: 69) and other writers have argued that the specific 
dynamics of the new neoliberal accumulation regime established firmly after the 
‘Volcker Coup’ are to blame for this aberration (see Giacché, 2011: 26; Kliman, 
2011: 89-90). Growth has been stymied by the new accumulation regime’s ‘monetary 
and financial mechanisms’ (Duménil and Lévy, 2004: 64-65). One example is the 
neoliberal governance model adopted by firms saw them move away from re- 
investing their money into a production and instead give out dividends to shareholders 
(Duménil and Lévy, 2011: 31). 
 
 
Yet a more recent body of writers diverge from this position, arguing instead that 
recovery has not occurred through ‘real’ growth in the productive capacity of the 
major capitalist economies, but rather through the expansion of the ‘unproductive’ 
sphere of the economy, in particular the financial sector (Smith and Butovsky, 2012: 
40). Capitalists responded to the low rates of return experienced in the 1970s and 
1980s by expanding investment into the financial sector, where higher profits were 
expected. Meanwhile, the demand for goods and services by workers in the economy 
has been maintained through the expansion of debt rather than real income. Thus, 
these authors argue, the crisis experienced in the 1970s and 1980s has not been 
overcome, but merely postponed through the expansion of fictitious capital, leading 
not only to a decline in the rates of growth of economic variables such as investment, 
but also the arrival of the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 (See Freeman, 2015: 
82-83 and Smith and Butovsky, 2012: 40 for overview of this debate). 
 
 
The disagreement seems to stem from issues in the measurement of economic 
variables, especially the rate of profit. Examining the UK rate of profit, for example, 
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Freeman finds that while authors like Kotz (2009: 309) argue neoliberal reforms in 
the 1980s instituted a ‘long economic expansion’ for the rate of profit, this belief is 
due to incorrect data. While financial returns are measured within ‘productive profit 
rates’, only productive capital is included in the capital assets that are used in 
production to achieve these rates or profit (Freeman 2015: 83). Looking at the US rate 
of profit, Kliman (2010), argues that the current cost (CC) approach utilized by 
Duménil and Lévy to measure the rate of profit fails to account for the actual return 
received by capitalists in production, since capital is measured at current (todays) 
replacement price as opposed to the historical price (Kliman, 2010: 114). It should be 
noted that these disagreements stem from a deeper issue regarding the Marxian 
ontological/epistemological nature of price and value and the ‘transformation 
problem’. Yet the complexity of the latter prohibits an in-depth analysis on the part of 
this limited thesis and its esoteric nature is left to the mountain of better works that 
provide oversight of the debate, especially (Freeman et al., 2004) 
 
 
Returning to the direct nature of measurement, Kliman (2010: 94) suggests there are 
many different ‘legitimate’ ways to measure the rate of profit depending on the 
question and no one definition can fulfil a ‘all purposes’ measurement role. For 
example, if the question relates to historical trends in the profitability of capitalists, 
then the best measure would be the ‘historic cost’ method (HC), which provides the 
actual amounts capitalists paid when engaging in production. Though a number of ad 
hominem arguments are levelled by Duménil and Lévy (2011) against Kliman and 
others who have adopted the HC approach25 the central objection they provide to the 
 
 
25 e.g. Duménil and Lévy (2010: 36-37) claim Kliman (and others of the Temporal Single- 
System Interpretation of Marxian value and price) ‘fiddl[e] with definitions’ to justify ‘a 
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HC approach is that it underestimates the cost of capital since it does not account for 
rising prices, i.e. inflation. Since Kliman (2010) does adjust for inflation from the HC 
data he utilizes, the basis for this argument is unclear. 
 
 
A more productive criticism of Kliman is Roberts (2016: 24; 276), whose own 
calculations on the HC (also adjust for inflation) and CC rate of profit lead him to 
suggest that while their aggregates are quite distinctive, their trend is nonetheless 
similar with both the CC and HC rate of profit recovering from 1982 to 1997 by 35 
percent and 12 percent respectively.26 Roberts’ (2016: 24) data shows that from 1997 
a decline began in both measures of the ROP. Yet Roberts also recognizes that despite 
the recovery of the 1980s, the secular trend in the ROP for the 20th century has been 
downward. What is more, profit rates from the 1980s were well below profit rates 
reached during the golden age (Roberts, 2016: 25). Many writers who argue a 
recovery took place in the ROP after the 1980s also recognize these did not match the 
pre-1980s ROP, among them Duménil and Lévy (2011: 564), who recognize ‘the 
profit rate in 2000 is still only half of its value in 1948’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“true” Marxian rate of profit’ which provides a ‘nostalgia’ for a belief in capitalism’s 
inevitable collapse 
26 Since both authors have collected data from the same source, the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), and construct the ROP in the same way, why Robert’s data reveals different 
conclusions from Kliman’s isn’t clear. One possible explanation may lay in the ‘significant’ 
revisions in the ‘classification and statistical methods’ for datasets that took place in 2009 by 
the BEA (2010). This means Kliman finished his data analysis before this revision took place 
and Roberts began his after. 
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The profit rate is also not the only important variable in consideration that produces 
issues in collation after 1980. As noted in Chapter 2, this thesis utilizes the Dunn and 
Bradstreet business failure data sets as a proxy for how much capital destruction 
occurs in the economy. Yet in 1984 Dunn and Bradstreet extended the coverage of its 
business failure rate from the manufacturing to all sectors of the economy. Naples 
(1997: 49) estimates this may have increased the number of firms counted as going 
into bankruptcy from 40-90% between 1984-1995. This is problematic when it is 
considered that a large portion of these firms are financial corporations, meaning the 
devalorisation of capital becomes difficult to measure if Marxist assumptions about 
the nature of valorization of commodities through labor are to be maintained. As 
argued, capital destruction only forms the basis for recovery when it allows the next 
cyclical generation of capitalist to take advantage of surplus value at a reduced 
exchange value (price). It is assumed in this thesis that the basis of surplus value 
comes from productive labour, not unproductive labour. Yet, finance capital, the 
foremost proponent of unproductive labour, is what began expanding beginning from 
the 1970s while manufacturing not only failed to keep pace but largely stopped 
growing from 1988. What amount of capital destruction that occurred with 
productive capital is therefore problematic since the data has been inundated by a 
huge expansion of finance capital. The same issue occurs if using a merger and 
acquisition dataset, with the population being inundated with financial firms. 
 
 
Below, two other pieces of data are examined to indicate to what degree capital 
destruction took place, though both have deficiencies that limit the strength of the 
conclusions about the degree of capital devalorisation. The first measure is the degree 
that inventories, the stock of goods a capitalists hold, decreased during the crisis 
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period of the 1970s and to what extent. In Figure 5.5 data is shown for three 
successive periods, each showing the absolute number by which manufacturing 
inventories decreased, calculated at 2016 USD. For example, in 1929 current 
inventory prices were $14 billion but by 1932 had decreased to $5.5 billion, a 
decrease of 8.5 billion. Converted into 2016 prices, this comes to slightly more than 
$95 billion (Abramovitz, 1948: 102). Now comparing this to period 1974-75, the only 
period during the 1970s during which there was a decline in inventories, it can be 
seen that capital did not lose nearly as much stock. The Great Recession did see a 
larger stockpile of inventories destroyed, but still significantly less than when 
compared to the Great Depression. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Three Periods of Decline in Inventory Stock, Constant US Dollars 
(2016) 
 
Source calculated from: Abramovitz, 1948: 102; USDC, 1980: 562; USDC, 2012: 516). 
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manufacturing and the Financial Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) in the US 
economy. This provides some indication that the post-1970s period saw no significant 
capital devalorisation. Between 1979 and 1980 manufacturing firm deaths increased 
from 18,697 to 23,174, or by 23 percent. Yet there was no sustained upward rate, and 
the amount of manufacturing firms either entering or leaving the market became 
stagnant after 1986, with a slow secular decline. The latest data from 2014 shows 
manufacturing death rate at its lowest level in the entire series, 13578. Meanwhile, the 
death of FIRE sector firms saw a secular trend upwards, a general indication of their 
growing importance to the US economy after the 1970s and thus of the growth of 
non-surplus producing capitalist in this period. 
 
Figure 5.6 Firm Deaths in the Manufacturing and FIRE Sector, 1977-2013 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated from Statistics provided by the US Census Bureau (2018) 
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economies also became a feedback loop for low profitability, since expansion into this 
sector took capital away from the manufacturing sector (Giacché, 2011: 26). The 
importance of the financial sector to the world economy, as well as the increase in its 
class power, would become especially evident during the next systemic crisis 
capitalist would face, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In attempting to put forward a preliminary Marxian theory of recovery, this thesis has 
made its central argument this: capital destruction/devalorisation is an economic 
tendency that occurs in economic crisis which helps eliminates low rate profit capital 
which in turn creates the ground from which a reinstatement of more normalized 
capitalist reproduction occurs. While this thesis does not presume to analyze the status 
of the economic phenomenon as a ‘law’ (such as Marx’s law of the tendential fall in 
the rate of profit) it does argue that empirically, it has been a recurrent theme through 
capitalist history. It prevalence as an economic phenomena can be seen by the 
evolving response by the US State; which at first embraced the process of 
devalorisation in the economic cycle, and then later attempted to terminate its effects. 
 
 
This thesis has attempted to establish this theoretical premise because of the 
deficiency amongst conventional Marxian crisis theorists to present a systematic 
account of economic recovery, failing to account for the persistence of capitalism 
emerging from cyclical and secular crisis into economic recovery and/or boom 
periods. To rectify this gap within the Marxian literature, this thesis has tried to 
establish the fundamentals from which a Marxian theory of recovery may be built. 
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Chapters 1 through 2 established capital destruction within the realm of abstract 
discussion, finding that the concept of recovery through capital destruction is 
theoretically consistent as an explanation for how capitalism is able to overcome 
crisis through its own internal tendencies. Chapter 3 discussed the ways capital 
destruction can best be measured, and also connected the first half of the thesis with 
the second half, as a movement between the abstract and general to the concrete and 
specific. Chapter 4 and 5 demonstrated the application of measuring capital 
destruction, looking at US capitalist accumulation between the late 19th century and 
the early 21st century. These chapter’s found capital destruction was a regular feature 
during the business cycle and that its reappearance has helped shape the US state’s 
fiscal and monetary policies. 
 
 
Capital destruction’s complex relation with the capitalist state has become significant 
for the mechanism’s very functioning in cyclical crisis. We have seen that the US 
State played a legitimizing role for the mechanism through being a major exponent of 
‘liquidationism’ and reassuring the public that socio-economic suffering caused by 
capitalist recessions, while necessary, was only temporary. 
 
 
Yet in response to working class pressure brought about by the extreme affliction 
suffered by the American population during the Great Depression, the State both 
changed and expanded its role in relation to capital destruction, actively seeking to 
prevent it with the onset of economic crisis. This had the consequence of not allowing 
the US rate of profit to recover as it had under previous crises and recovery cycles, a 
contradiction that has caused many developed capitalist countries, including the US, 
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to experience an intensifying stagnation since the 1970s, the evidence of which was 
examined at the end of chapter 5. 
 
 
Findings and Conclusions 
 
 
Having now placed capital destruction/devalorisation in a ‘rich totality’ of relations, 
some significant implications for the understanding of the inner workings of 
capitalism and the future of capitalism can be brought forward. Firstly, in 
contemplating capitalism future path of reproduction, and as laid out in chapter 5, it 
remains unclear whether enough capital destruction occurred during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s to restore a healthy level of profitability for the global capitalist 
economy, yet the poor performance in the profit rate after 1982 suggest that even if 
capital destruction did occur, it was not enough to incentives strong levels of 
accumulation in many developed economies. This indicates that, without this capital 
destruction, growth rates in developed countries will continue to stagnate, and that 
another economic crisis will be needed before there is genuine economic recovery for 
capitalism on a global scale. 
 
 
Perhaps more importantly, however, capital destruction, especially as we have seen it 
related to the course of US economic development, informs social scientists about the 
nature of capitalism, an argument which Marx (2015: 359; 372) himself first 
postulated. This is the notion that the mode of production of capitalism is one of 
inherent contradiction. While capital destruction is a mechanism by which capitalism 
may overcome economic crisis, it’s very functioning can often kindle political crisis. 
One of the fundamental social contracts of capitalism is that worker will be able to 
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sell their labour power for subsistence. Capital destruction disrupts this social contract 
through bankrupting the capitalists who provide the means by which labour subsists. 
If the capitalist class try to alleviate these social consequences by neutralizing the 
mechanism through agents such as the State, this will mean the rate of profit will be 
unable to recover, thus causing long term stagnation. In essence, while capital 
destruction is effective for securing short term economic recovery, it the long term it 
serves to illuminate the fundamental exploitative relation between labour and capital 
under capitalism, thereby serving to undermine the mode of production itself. 
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